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Giving to the global poor is widely considered supererogatory. But is this all 
that morality demands of us? In this thesis, I explore the extent of our moral 
responsibility to the global poor, as framed in terms of Thomas Pogge’s argument. I 
defend Pogge’s thesis—that affluent individuals are morally responsible for global 
poverty because they have partly caused it—against a number of important criticisms. 
While I show these objections to be largely unsuccessful, I suggest that they 
nevertheless point us to the limits of what Pogge can claim. I argue that Pogge does not 
succeed in establishing the strong conclusions that he draws about the extent of our 
moral obligations to the global poor. In concluding, I defend a more nuanced account 
of moral responsibility than the one Pogge offers.  
 1 
Introduction 
The sheer numbers of people in this world who live in severe and life-
threatening poverty are both astonishing and depressing at once. According to the 
World Bank’s statistical data, a staggering 2.8 billion or 46% of the world's population 
subsist on less than US$2 per person per day.1
 To be sure, many in the developed world have heard of the problem of global 
poverty. But relatively few know, or perhaps care to know, of the magnitude of the 
problem. The extent of poverty in the world is such that millions live each day without 
the basic necessities that we in the affluent world take for granted—such as clean 
water, electricity, shelter and basic sanitation. The facts are telling: An estimated 1.1 
billion people lack access to safe water, 2.6 billion lack access to basic sanitation, 1 
billion lack adequate shelter and 1.6 billion lack electricity. Each year, as many as 18 
million people die prematurely as a result of easily preventable and treatable diseases 
like tuberculosis, pneumonia and diarrhoea. These deaths, which account for a third of 
all human deaths each year, are poverty-related and occur almost entirely in the 
world’s poorest countries.
 Such an existence of severe deprivation 
is, to those of us who live in the affluent world, simply inconceivable.  
2
 These figures are troubling. On their own, they underscore the gravity and the 
urgency of the problem. But in light of the kind of wealth enjoyed by the world's upper 
stratum, these figures speak of how surely there is something very morally troubling 
about the way the world is. The fact is that, in 2004, the bottom 2.5 billion of the 
poorest people on earth together accounted for only about 1.67 percent of the total 
household consumption expenditure, while the top 1 billion of the high-income earners 
 
                                                        
1 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 2.  
2 Ibid. 
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together accounted for 81 percent.3 With global inequality as vast as this, it appears 
that the wealthiest one tenth of the human population could abolish severe poverty at 
minimal cost to themselves. Thomas Pogge puts the figure of negating the aggregate 
shortfall of the world’s poor at a mere one percent reduction in the aggregate annual 
gross national income of high-income economies.4 While it is common for many 
people to drive the conclusion that the eradication of poverty will put such immense 
resource strains on the affluent that it will ineluctably impoverish and jeopardize 
affluent states, these figures point to the error of thinking so.5
 The empirical data presented by Thomas Pogge in his book World Poverty and 
Human Rights suggests that poverty eradication is feasible, at least as far as economic 
resources are concerned. Given this, one might wonder why it is that the severe 
deprivations of a third of humanity nevertheless persists alongside the excesses and 
wealth of so many privileged others. While the global poor live each day in desperate 
need of food, shelter and basic medical treatment, we affluent individuals preoccupy 
ourselves with keeping up with the latest technology and fashion, while driving around 
in cars and living in comfortable apartments. The persistence of extensive and severe 
poverty in the world despite the relative affluence of others is something that demands 
some explanation.  
 
                                                        
3 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 104-5. 
4 Ibid., 10.  
5 As Pogge notes, Hirschman’s jeopardy thesis, which holds that world poverty is so massive a 
problem that its eradication will be at a cost that rich societies cannot bear, is a widely-shared 
assumption. Richard Rorty, for example, has voiced doubts to this effect, as when he made the 
claim that “a politically feasible project of egalitarian redistribution of wealth requires there to 
be enough money around to insure that, after the redistribution, the rich will still be able to 
recognize themselves – will still think their lives worth living.” Albert O. Hirschman, The 
Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999) and Richard Rorty, “Who are We? Moral Universalism and Economic Triage,” 
Diogenes 173 (1996): 14-15, quoted in Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 9. 
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One possible explanation for this huge disparity between the poor and us, I 
suggest, is that we do not find poverty’s eradication morally compelling. Given that 
needs are urgent and the means to meet them are available to us, what is lacking, it 
seems, is a collective moral and political will to do more for the poor. Whatever the 
figures and whatever the numbers indicating the extent of global poverty, many people 
simply will not do more to help the global poor if they do not think they have any 
strong moral obligations to do so.  
But why is this so? As Thomas Pogge, I think, rightly notes, it is a common 
assumption amongst most people that our obligations to help the global poor are fairly 
weak and minimal. This belief is based on two assumptions. The first is the widely-
held intuition that we have strong moral obligations to the global poor only if we are 
the cause of their plight, but not if we merely fail to eradicate the harms which we have 
no part in causing. The second is the assumption is that we, as affluent individuals, 
play no part in bringing about global poverty. With these two assumptions, we 
conclude that we have no strong moral obligations whatsoever to help the global poor, 
and that our obligations to help them extend only as far as (occasional) charity goes.  
But is this really all that morality demands of us? Given the magnitude of the 
problem of global poverty, it is important that we take seriously questions about where 
responsibility for eradicating world poverty lies, and whether the responsibility lies 
with us. The aim of this thesis is to consider the question of whether, as relatively 
affluent individuals, we are morally responsible for the massive poverty that persists in 
many parts of the world, and if so, to what extent we are thus responsible. In this 
thesis, I will do this by way of looking at the arguments put forward by Thomas Pogge 
in his book World Poverty and Human Rights.  
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The central idea that Pogge develops and defends in World Poverty and Human 
Rights is the rather controversial one that we, the relatively affluent in the world, are 
actively responsible for world poverty given that we are, in no small way, the cause of 
it. His thesis rests on the defense of two main claims:6
(1) There is a global institutional order that is imposed by the affluent on 
the global poor that foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty 
in the world in a significant way.  
  
(2) Affluent individuals have negative duties not to harm others and they 
violate this negative duty when they participate in and benefit from a 
global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably engenders 
severe poverty in the world.  
In this paper, I seek only to examine and discuss the latter claim. An 
investigation into the factual basis of the former, while an important and worthy task, 
will take us too far afield and beyond the scope of this paper. It is my intention, 
therefore, to leave aside questions about the truth of Pogge’s empirical claim 
concerning the global causes of world poverty and to focus instead on exploring the 
moral implications that follow from it if it were true. Specifically, the question that this 
thesis is concerned with is as follows: if it is, as Pogge argues, the case that the global 
institutional order inflicts foreseeable and avoidable harms on the global poor, to what 
extent can affluent individuals be said to have violated their negative duty not to harm 
and so be held morally responsible for eradicating global poverty? In pursuit of this, I 
shall examine Pogge’s argument that affluent individuals are morally responsible for                                                         
6 This argument that I present here is based on Pogge’s institutional approach to the problem. 
As will be discussed later on in this thesis, Pogge offers three different strands of argument in 
support of his thesis: the Lockean state-of-nature approach, the historical injustices approach, 
and the institutional approach. My critique and analysis of Pogge’s argument is based only the 
last of these approaches, i.e. the institutional approach.  
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global poverty because and to the extent that they are participants in an unjust global 
order.  
One objection that can be brought to bear upon Pogge’s claim that affluent 
individuals are morally responsible for global poverty is the skeptical view of Rüdiger 
Bittner, who writes that 
 [world poverty] is an outcome of what a large number of people did, and in 
doing what they do, these people may be pursuing the same or different, even 
opposite ends, or indeed ends unrelated to each other. Moreover, none of the 
actors involved overlooks their whole interplay. The outcome, therefore, is not 
clearly anybody’s doing in particular. They did something together, that is true, 
but neither collectively nor individually were they master over what emerged.7
 
 
According to Bittner, global poverty is not a moral problem but a wholly political one.8
What Bittner says here is not directed specifically at Pogge’s argument. 
However, his objection is a general one that all arguments attempting to defend moral 
responsibility for global poverty must overcome. In this thesis, I bring Bittner’s general 
objection to bear upon Pogge’s position as an important objection. Having done so, I 
go on to provide a defense of Pogge’s position. My defense of Pogge does not go all 
the way, however. For even though I show Bittner’s objection to be unsuccessful, I 
argue that it nevertheless points us to the limits of what Pogge can claim about the 
extent of our moral obligations to the global poor.  
 
World poverty, he argues, is not imputable to anyone. While the actions and decisions 
of many affluent individuals across the world may, together, result in substantial harms 
to the global poor, he claims that these harms can neither be imputed to affluent 
individuals considered as a collective nor as individuals.  
 
                                                        
7 Rüdiger Bittner, “Morality and World Hunger,” Metaphilosophy 31, no. 1/2 (2001): 30, 
emphasis mine.  
8 Ibid., 27.  
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1 An Overview 
I begin by contextualizing Pogge’s argument in the current philosophical 
discourse on global poverty by contrasting his approach with the most prominent of 
approaches on this issue—that of Peter Singer’s. I do this, in Chapter One, by bringing 
into question the foundational assumptions that underlie our inaction in doing more 
than we presently do for the global poor. I also explore the ways in which Peter Singer 
and Thomas Pogge have both attempted to challenge these commonly held 
assumptions. In a critical discussion of how Pogge’s approach compares with that of 
Singer’s, I examine how Pogge’s approach is arguably the more promising of the two 
approaches insofar as it avoids some of the difficulties that Singer’s approach faces.  
In Chapter Two, I set out a detailed exposition of the argument that Pogge 
advances in his book World Poverty and Human Rights. Paying particular attention to 
Pogge’s institutional approach to the problem, I consider how Pogge argues for the 
thesis that affluent individuals are violating their negative duty not to harm others by 
imposing upon the global poor an unjust global institutional order that foreseeably and 
avoidably produces poverty.  
In Chapter Three, I consider Bittner’s objection that it is untenable to attribute 
moral responsibility for global poverty to any individual because world poverty is a 
non-imputable situation, whether viewed in terms of collective or individual 
responsibility. Drawing from the various objections of critics of Pogge’s position, I 
develop Bittner’s general objection as an objection to Pogge’s thesis, as follows: 
Understood collectively, it might be objected that insofar as affluent individuals do not 
act in pursuit of a common end, they do not constitute a collective and so can in no 
way be said to act collectively to cause harm to the poor. Understood individually, it 
might be objected that insofar as affluent individuals (i) make no marginal 
 7 
contributions as individual agents to harming the poor, (ii) fail to meet the criteria of 
sufficient agency when acting in the context of the global order, and (iii) act with no 
intention of harming the global poor, they cannot be said to individually harm the 
global poor in a morally problematic way and so cannot be held morally responsible.  
If these two sets of objections that I consider are valid and it is shown that 
affluent individuals cannot—either individually or collectively—be said to harm the 
global poor in a way that renders them morally responsible, then Pogge’s conclusion 
that affluent individuals violate their negative duty not to harm the global poor by 
participating in the global order must be rejected. If it can be shown, however, that 
affluent individuals can be said to harm the global poor—either individually or as a 
collective—then Pogge’s conclusion stands. In Chapter Four, I challenge the claim that 
affluent individuals cannot be said to individually harm the global poor. Since only one 
of the two sets of objections need to be refuted in order to defend Pogge’s conclusion, I 
contend that Pogge’s argument is, in fact, defensible against Bittner’s objection.  
I conclude, in Chapter Five, with a discussion of the implications of my defense 
of Pogge on his overall conclusions. In this final chapter, I argue that what Pogge can 
claim about the extent of our moral obligations to the global poor is more limited than 
he claims it is, for two reasons. First, while Pogge is right in saying that we violate our 
negative duties insofar as we contribute to harming the global poor, he is mistaken in 
claiming that we violate our negative duties insofar as we benefit from the harms of the 
global poor without compensation. Second, Pogge is wrong to think that we are 
morally responsible for global poverty simply by virtue of our uncompensated 
contributions to the existing unjust global order. For, as I argue, not every instance of 
contributing to the harms suffered by the global poor renders us morally responsible. In 
view of both these considerations, I argue that Pogge is wrong to claim that all affluent 
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individuals who participate in and benefit from the ongoing unjust global institutional 
order have moral responsibility to eradicate poverty. This thesis thus concludes by 
proposing a more nuanced account of moral responsibility than the one Pogge 
provides.  
 
2  Clarifying Some Key Concepts 
Before I plunge into a full-fledged discussion of the issue at hand, it would be 
helpful to first clarify some of the key concepts on which this project’s inquiry rests. In 
this section, I clarify the ways in which the terms poverty, the global poor, affluent 
individuals and the global institutional order, as employed in this thesis, are to be 
understood.  
 
Poverty and the Global Poor 
While poverty is commonly understood as the condition of being poor, or of 
being lacking in money and material possessions, the problem with poverty is more 
than just that. Poverty brings with it a whole host of other problems: it renders people 
vulnerable to many related ills, including hunger and malnutrition, disease, 
homelessness, premature death, illiteracy, political powerlessness and social 
disempowerment.9
                                                        
9 Abigail Gosselin, Global Poverty and Individual Responsibility (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 
2009), 2.  
 In this thesis, poverty will be understood as the lack of secure 
access to the resources necessary in providing a measure of protection against these 
problems. Since most people would agree that a minimally decent life is one that is 
free of these problems, poverty, as understood in this thesis, may thus be defined as the 
lack of secure access to the basic resources necessary for living a minimally decent 
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life. Following Pogge, I take resources to refer to the goods that people need in order 
to survive or thrive, including goods such as nutritious food, clean water, basic 
clothing and shelter, education and healthcare.10
With poverty defined, we have, then, also a definition of the global poor. The 
global poor that I refer to in this thesis are characterized by their absolute poverty as 
well as by their relative poverty. In absolute terms, the global poor are those who lack 
secure access to the basic resources necessary for living a minimally decent life. In 
relative terms, the global poor are those who are very much worse off, in terms of 





Since the main concern of this thesis is with the responsibility that affluent 
individuals have towards the global poor, it is important to clarify what I mean by the 
term affluent individual. Following Pogge, what constitutes affluence in my use of the 
term affluent individual is both absolute as well as relative to my use of the term global 
poor. In absolute terms, I consider as affluent the group of individuals who enjoy 
secure access to the resources necessary for a minimally decent life, regardless of 
whether there are others who lack access to these necessary resources. In relative 
terms, I consider as affluent the group of individuals who are significantly better off 
than others in terms of secure access to the resources necessary for a minimally decent 
life.  
Defined as such, the middle-class in most first-world developed nations fall 
squarely in this class of individuals whom I refer to as affluent individuals; others                                                         
10 Gosselin, Global Poverty and Individual Responsibility, 55. 
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similarly situated in other parts of the world, including the wealthy elites of poor 
developing countries, would also be considered affluent.11
 
 
The Global Institutional Order 
  Thomas Pogge does not specify what he means by the global institutional order 
that he claims is perpetuating global poverty in the world. However, he does write that 
“[i]nstitutions govern the interactions between individuals and collective agents, and 
they also structure the access that agents have to material resources.”12 From this it is 
clear that Pogge adopts the Rawlsian understanding of institution. So following John 
Rawls, I take the term institution as used by Pogge, to mean “a social practice, set of 
rules, or other structure that serves as a backdrop for what actions agents are able or 
expected to take, providing a system of rewards and punishments that create 
expectations for behavior and penalties or failing to meet expectations.”13 Understood 
in this way, institutions have a normative function. They are capable of being designed 
and changed in ways that make it more or less just, according to the ways that they 
govern individual actions.14
                                                        
11 Pogge writes, “The question is not: What are we doing to the poorer countries? The crucial 
question is: What are we and the rulers and elites of the less developed countries, together, 
doing to their impoverished populations?” See Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 30. 
 A clearer idea of what Pogge means by the global 
institutional order will be articulated in my discussion of Pogge’s argument in Chapter 
Two of this thesis.  
12 Thomas Pogge, “Human Flourishing and Universal Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy 
16, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 337; Thomas W. Pogge, “Three Problems with Contractarian-
Consequentialist Ways of Assessing Social Institutions,” Social Philosophy and Policy 
(Summer 1995): 241. 
13 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), 47-52; 
J.L.Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1977): 80-82, as 
cited in Gosselin, Global Poverty and Individual Responsibility, 120.  
14 Gosselin, Global Poverty and Individual Responsibility, 120-121. 
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1    Contextualizing Pogge 
Introduction 
The issue of global poverty stands as one of the most urgent ethical issues of 
our time. It is important, in thinking about our moral stake in global poverty, that we 
articulate and evaluate our widely held assumptions about our moral obligations to the 
global poor to see how well they stand up to critical reflection. As I have noted earlier, 
the belief that we, affluent individuals, have no strong moral obligations to help the 
global poor, seems to rest on two widely held assumptions. The first is the moral 
intuition that we have no strong moral obligations to help others unless we have played 
a part in causing them harm. The second is the assumption that global poverty is a 
problem that has little to do with us. But are we right to think that we are not morally 
responsible for the global poor on the basis of the assumption that we have no strong 
obligations to those whom we have not harmed? How are we related to the world’s 
poor? Are we, as most people assume, mere innocent bystanders of the plight of the 
poor, or are we in fact connected to the issue and implicated in causing their suffering?  
There are two ways of responding to the foregoing belief that we have no 
strong obligations to do more than we presently do for the global poor. The first is to 
undermine the former assumption, that is, the moral intuition that we have no strong 
moral obligations to those who are in need but whom we have not harmed. This is the 
approach of Peter Singer, who argues that our duties to help those in need are no less 
stringent than our duties to redress whatever harms we have caused. The second way is 
to accept the former intuition, but to challenge the latter assumption that we are mere 
innocent bystanders of the plight of the poor. This is the approach taken by Thomas 
Pogge, who argues that we are morally responsible for the global poor insofar as we 
violate our negative duty not to harm them. 
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In what follows, I shall outline the arguments of Peter Singer and Thomas 
Pogge, thereby examining the ways that they have challenged the basis of the two 
foregoing assumptions. In a broad comparison of the two approaches, I suggest that 
Pogge’s approach is arguably the better of the two because it avoids some of the 
difficulties that Singer’s approach faces.   
 
1.1   Distinctions in Duties: Negative and Positive 
Before I engage in the task of comparing Singer and Pogge, let me begin my 
discussion with an analysis of some starting assumptions about positive and negative 
duties. This is an interesting and important point to begin with, if only because noting 
the distinction between the two kinds of duties is crucial in helping us understand an 
important difference between Singer’s and Pogge’s approaches, as well as in 
understanding Pogge’s reasons for invoking only negative duties in his argument. 
Because the distinction between positive and negative duties is controversial and has 
been drawn in various ways, it would be helpful to begin by clarifying the distinction 
and the two accounts of duty based on this distinction.   
Negative duties refer to duties to ensure that others are not unduly harmed or 
wronged through one’s conduct. The negative account of duty justifies duties of two 
kinds. One, agents have duties of forbearance, that is, duties that involve refraining 
from wrongfully harming others. For example, we each have a negative duty not to 
harm others by exercising reasonable care in driving so as not to put pedestrians and 
other drivers at risk of being harmed. Such duties are agent-neutral, in that they are 
universal in scope, held by all agents and directed at everyone. They can be fulfilled 
 13 
either by refraining from certain actions or simply by omission.15
Two, agents have duties of redress to rectify whatever wrongful harms they 
might have caused others. So, suppose I drive recklessly and injure a pedestrian 
crossing the road. I have duties of redress to compensate him for the harms I have 
caused him by, say, paying for his medical bills. Duties of redress are agent-relative, in 
that they apply to those particular agents who have wrongfully harmed others, and are 
directed to those specific others whom those particular agents have harmed. 
  
16
It is also widely accepted as part of one’s negative duties that we each also have 
what Pogge calls intermediate duties to avert harms that one’s past conduct may cause 
in the future.
 Unlike 
duties of forbearance, duties of redress oblige action on the part of the agent. Negative 
duties can thus generate positive duties, as when duties of redress come into the 
picture.  
17
Positive duties refer to duties to benefit or assist others that are in positions 
worse-off than ours. The bearer of responsibility on the positive account of duty is the 
agent with the ability to increase the well-being of others, and it is on account of this 
ability that she has responsibility. Duties of beneficence are, like duties of forbearance, 
 Suppose again that I drive recklessly and run over a pedestrian crossing 
the road. The pedestrian is seriously injured and would die if no one sends him to the 
hospital immediately. In a situation such as this, I have intermediate duties to rush the 
injured pedestrian to the hospital to seek medical treatment, so as to avert, as much as 
is possible, the harms that my bad conduct (of reckless driving) might cause the 
pedestrian in the near future.  
                                                        
15 Abigail Gosselin, “Global Poverty and Responsibility: Identifying the Duty-Bearers of 
Human Rights,” Human Rights Review (Oct–Dec 2006): 37.  
16 Ibid., 36.  
17 Thomas Pogge, “Real World Justice,” The Journal of Ethics 9, no. 1/2 (2005): 35.  
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agent-neutral and so apply universally to all agents.18
Having clarified this conventional distinction in duties, let me now briefly 
explicate the views of advocates of negative duty and of positive duty respectively. 
Those who argue that we are bound only by negative duties hold the view that we have 
obligations to others only if we are responsible for the harms that they suffer. Negative 
duty theorists (notably libertarians such as Robert Nozick
 However, unlike duties of 
forbearance, they can be fulfilled only by positive action or active involvement on the 
part of the agent. The positive account of duty entails that agents each have duties of 
beneficence to help or benefit others who are in situations that are worse-off than 
theirs, even if the situation is not the result of harms brought about by them. So, for 
example, I have a positive duty to help a pedestrian who is bleeding badly from a road 
accident should I come across one, even if I was not the one responsible for injuring 
the pedestrian in the first place. 
19) are among those who 
deny obligations to benefit others whom we have not directly harmed. Advocates of 
positive duty, on the other hand, accept obligations generated from both negative as 
well as positive duties. Unlike negative-duty theorists, positive-duty theorists (notably 
Peter Singer, Peter Unger and Henry Shue20
There is a third camp that belongs to neither of these two views, and that 
) consider duties to benefit others in need 
to be no less stringent than negative duties of forbearance and redress. Since, for the 
positive-duty theorist, one’s duty to help a stranger in need is as stringent as one’s duty 
not to harm a stranger, the positive-negative duty distinction is, on the positive account 
of duty, not a morally significant one.  
                                                        
18 Gosselin, Global Poverty and Individual Responsibility, 68-69. 
19 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
20 Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 
(1972): 229-243; Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); and Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: 
Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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represents the view of most ordinary folks. Most people accept obligations generated 
from both negative as well as positive duties, while maintaining the positive-negative 
duty distinction as a morally significant one. They accept that we have positive duties 
of beneficence to help others worse off than us, but take these positive duties to be less 
stringent than negative ones.21
 
 So, returning to the example, both the driver and the 
passerby have duties to help the injured pedestrian. However, the driver has a greater 
duty to help the injured pedestrian than the passerby does, because his negative duties 
of redress are viewed as more stringent than the passerby’s positive ones to give aid.  
1.2   Overview of Singer’s and Pogge’s Arguments 
Singer’s Argument 
Keeping in mind this distinction that cuts across negative and positive duties, 
we can now turn to the arguments put forward by Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge. Let 
me begin with Singer’s argument, which invokes positive duties of beneficience and 
rejects the intuition that we have no strong moral obligations to those who are in need 
but whom we have not harmed.  
In his seminal paper “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer famously 
argues that we are wrong to think that giving to the poor is supererogatory.22
                                                        
21 Pogge notes that the claim that negative duties are more stringent than positive duties is “a 
very weak assumption, accepted not merely by libertarians but by pretty much all, except act-
consequentialists.” See Pogge, “Real World Justice,” 34.  
 Singer 
argues that it is a matter of moral obligation that the affluent give up a considerable 
part of their wealth to the severely poor, and that to fail to do so is to fail to lead “a 
22 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 229-243. 
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morally decent life.”23
Singer goes on to argue that just as one should jump into a shallow pond to 
save a drowning child’s life since one stands to do much at little cost to oneself, for the 
same reasons, we should, as affluent individuals, donate generously to give aid to the 
global poor. For given our relative affluence compared to the global poor, there is 
clearly much that we can do to alleviate the sufferings of the poor without having to 
sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance.  
 He makes this point by way of the following example: Imagine 
that on your way to giving a lecture, you walk past a pond where a child is in danger of 
drowning. You know that the pond is shallow and that you could easily wade in to 
rescue the drowning child. However, doing so would be at the cost of muddying your 
clothes. Singer points out that, caught in a situation like this, it would be morally 
monstrous of you to allow these minor considerations to count against the decision to 
save the child’s life.  
Singer’s conclusion can be derived from what he takes to be two 
uncontroversial premises. First, suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and 
medical care are bad. Second, if it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we 
ought, morally, to do it. This obligation, argues Singer, should neither be diminished by 
the physical distance between the rich and poor, nor by the fact that there are many 
others who are similarly positioned to help. With this argument, Singer concludes that 
affluent individuals have strong obligations to give up a considerably large part of their 
wealth to help eradicate poverty.24
 
 
                                                        
23 Peter Singer, “The Singer Solution to World Poverty,” New York Times Magazine, 
September 5, 1999, 60-63, in Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (New York: Ecco Press, 
2000), 124. 
24 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 107-8. 
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Pogge’s Argument 
In contrast to Singer, who conceives of our obligations to the global poor in 
terms of the positive account of duty, Pogge conceives of our obligations in terms of 
negative duties. Pogge’s central thesis is that we affluent individuals in the developed 
countries are responsible for global poverty insofar as we have, at least in part, caused 
it. His argument in support of this thesis rests on the defense of two main claims. The 
first claim is that we affluent individuals are imposing on the global poor a global 
institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the 
world in a significant way. According to Pogge, global institutions such as the IMF, the 
WTO, and the World Bank, as well as global rules of interaction such as property 
rights protection, tariffs on developing country imports, arms sales, and subsidies to 
domestic agriculture, etc., “foreseeably [give] rise to a greater underfulfillment of 
human rights than would be reasonably avoidable.”25 The second claim is that we each 
have negative duties not to harm others, and by participating in and upholding an 
unjust global institutional order that is shaped in the interests of the world’s affluent at 
the expense of the world’s poor, we are harming the global poor and so violating our 
negative duty. Given these two central claims, Pogge concludes that we have moral 
obligations, based on duties of redress, to either put an end to the harms that we cause 
the global poor, or else compensate the victims for the harms caused.26
 
 
1.3   A Broad Comparison of the Two 
Having provided a brief overview of the arguments made by both Singer and 
Pogge, I turn now to the task of engaging both approaches in a broad comparison.                                                         
25 Pogge, “Real World Justice,” 45. 
26 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 56. 
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Comparing and contrasting the two, I do not attempt to offer an exhaustive account of 
the differences between them. I seek only to defend Pogge’s approach as the more 
promising of the two insofar as his approach avoids some of the difficulties that 
Singer’s approach faces. I discuss three such difficulties.  
The first concerns Singer’s failure to capture the common intuition that there is 
a morally significant distinction between positive and negative duties. As I have noted 
in Chapter 1.1, we generally think that we have stronger duties not to harm others than 
we do to give aid to protect and benefit others. As an example, suppose that, as an 
owner of a chemical plant, I release toxic wastewater into a nearby river, thereby 
causing those who live nearby to fall ill and die from mercury poisoning. In such a 
situation, I think most people would say that because I was the main culprit behind the 
harms inflicted, I have stronger moral obligations than others, who did nothing to cause 
the pollution, to remedy the problem. The intuition that underlies this judgment, it 
seems, is the intuition that negative duties not to harm are more stringent than positive 
duties to give aid.  
If I am right about this, then it seems that Singer’s argument does not fit well 
with the common intuition. For, as discussed in Chapter 1.2, Singer’s argument rests 
on our accepting that positive duties are no less stringent than negative duties not to 
harm. In failing to take seriously the conventional distinction between the two kinds of 
duties, Singer’s argument goes against the strong moral intuition held by most people 
that the distinction is a morally relevant one.  
Unlike Singer, Pogge does not reject the widely-shared intuition that positive 
duties are not as stringent as negative duties. Instead, Pogge’s strategy is to show that 
one need not support the principle of beneficence (as Singer’s recipient-oriented 
approach requires of us) in order to justify obligations to the global poor. He does this 
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by way of undermining the factual basis for thinking that we are not substantial 
contributors to the widespread and life-threatening poverty abroad, and then arguing 
that we have responsibilities to the global poor on account of our negative duties of 
redress. By invoking only negative duties in his arguments, Pogge appeals to the 
common intuition that gives priority to negative duties over positive ones. 
To be sure, it does not follow from the fact that an argument coincides with a 
commonly held intuition that it is therefore the better one. However, even as I maintain 
an agnostic position on the question of whether the negative-positive duty distinction is 
a morally significant one, I can nevertheless agree with Pogge that the stronger model 
of responsibility is the one that is more widely convincing and more broadly accepted. 
By invoking the more stringent negative duties in his argument, Pogge provides those 
who hold the view that negative duties are more stringent than positive duties (which, 
according to Pogge, includes most people except act-consequentialists) with stronger 
reason to act on poverty eradication than do positive theorists like Singer, who appeal 
only to positive duties of beneficence. Given the broad sharability of the view that 
negative duties are more stringent than positive duties, most people will find arguments 
that appeal to the force of negative duties more compelling and more forceful than 
arguments that appeal only to positive duties. Thus I argue that Pogge’s approach is 
more promising than Singer’s insofar as it fits well with the common intuition and is, 
for that reason, more compelling and more widely-convincing. 
The second difficulty faced by Singer’s approach has to do with its failure to 
take into account libertarian concerns. As discussed in Chapter 1.1, positive duties that 
prescribe actions to benefit others generally involve active intervention, and are usually 
considered to be more controversial than negative duties, which merely prohibit certain 
actions and so act as side constraints to actions. For the libertarian who takes negative 
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duties as fundamental and denies positive duties to aid altogether, Singer’s approach, 
which appeals to positive duties, is unpersuasive.  
Unlike Singer, whose approach is persuasive only to those who accept that we 
each have positive duties to protect and give aid, Pogge does away with positive duties 
in his arguments and so appeals to a wider range of audiences, including those of a 
libertarian bent. Pogge redefines the debate on global poverty by arguing for how the 
affluent individual’s responsibility for world poverty can fit within the libertarian 
framework. By leaving aside all talk of positive duties in his argument, Pogge makes 
compatible his approach with the libertarian framework.  
In leaving aside positive duties in his argument, it is worth noting that Pogge is 
not defending the libertarian position that there are only negative duties and rejecting 
the idea that we have positive duties to assist the poor. Pogge is merely avoiding 
claims about positive duties so that his case does not rest on belief in positive duties.27
The third difficulty that Singer’s approach faces is that of meeting criticisms 
concerning its overdemandingness. Singer’s approach has been roundly criticised for 
the fact that his theory yields results that are overly demanding. If Singer is right in his 
argument, then what we have before us is a very strong principle of obligatory 
beneficence. By his mode of reasoning, because very few things are as morally 
important as saving life, most of our material acquisitions and pursuits are but luxuries 
 
His invoking of only negative and intermediate duties allows him to appeal to a wider 
range of audiences with different political conceptions and so puts him at an 
argumentative advantage over Singer, whose recipient-oriented approach invokes the 
more controversial positive duties to aid.  
                                                        
27 As Pogge himself points out, his argument “can and is meant to reach those who discard as 
phony or feeble all positive duties to aid and protect the vulnerable.” See Thomas Pogge, 
"Reply to Critics: Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties," Ethics & International 
Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): 61.  
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of little or no moral significance. Given its utilitarian basis, Singer’s theory demands 
that we should donate to the global poor, up to the point where any further giving 
generates significant morally relevant costs to our own lives, that is to say, where any 
further giving makes us worse off than those whom we are helping. The objection 
against Singer, therefore, is that his theory sets an overly demanding standard of 
morality to be practicable.  
Practically speaking, however, Singer suggests that we should place an upper 
limit on what we give, so that we do not lower our own level of affluence so much as 
to render ourselves incapable of sustaining efforts to help the needy in the long run. 
The idea is that if we give too much, we may end up doing more harm than good since 
not only will we cease to be able to better the situation of others, we might also reduce 
our own positions to that of being in need. Given this, how much should we give 
exactly? Singer writes, “The formula is simple: whatever money you’re spending on 
luxuries, not necessities, should be given away.”28
In spite of this reformulation, Singer’s moral theory nevertheless demands far 
more than commonsense morality demands of us, and so strikes many as overly 
demanding. Furthermore, following Bernard Williams’ general attack against 
utilitarianism, Singer’s theory may be criticised for making unreasonably high 
demands on us in its requirement that people make sacrifices that would seriously 
disrupt their life’s projects and plans in order to benefit the less privileged. Singer’s 
demanding principle of beneficence forces us to subordinate all of our own interests 
  
                                                        
28 Singer, “The Singer Solution,” 123. 
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and projects to those of others, and so may be criticised for failing to respect individual 
people as worthwhile beings leading worthwhile and important lives.29
Pogge’s approach avoids this overdemandingness objection that Singer’s 
argument faces. Unlike Singer, whose focus is on ‘the harm that all people suffer,’ 
Pogge’s focus is only on ‘the harm that we are materially involved in causing.’
 
30
The negative account of duty that Pogge invokes in his argument justifies 
duties of two kinds—duties of forbearance and duties of redress—both of which are 
less demanding than the positive duties of beneficence invoked by Singer. Duties of 
forbearance that Pogge invokes are less demanding than positive duties since, unlike 
positive duties, they do not require active involvement on the part of the agent and can 
be fulfilled either by omission or by refraining from certain actions. Further, duties of 
redress are less demanding than positive duties because unlike positive duties, which 
are universal in scope, held by all agents and directed at everyone, duties of redress 
apply only to those particular agents who have wrongfully harmed others, and are 
directed only at those whom they have harmed. Hence, by appealing only to negative 
duties of forbearance and redress in justifying the affluent individual’s moral 
obligations to the global poor, Pogge offers a less morally demanding account of 
morality than does Singer, and so avoids the overdemandingness objection that 
Singer’s approach is vulnerable to.  
 By 
focusing on the negative duties that we have not to harm others, as opposed to positive 
duties that we have to protect and aid others, Pogge narrows the scope of our moral 
obligations and so offers a less morally demanding account of responsibility than does 
Singer.  
                                                        
29 Bernard Williams and J.J.C. Smart, "Utilitarianism: For and Against (excerpts)," in Ethics: 
History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, ed. Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 585-601.  




Whereas Singer’s approach runs against common intuitions, is unpersuasive to 
those of a libertarian bent, and is seen by most as overly demanding, Pogge’s approach 
is otherwise. In light of these considerations, there appears to be good reason to favour 
Pogge’s approach over Singer’s. However, one should not be too quick to assume that 
Pogge’s approach is therefore the better of the two. Even though Pogge’s approach 
may be successful where Singer’s is not, his approach would be no better if it brings 
with it its own set of problems. I will, in what follows, attempt to lay any such 
suspicions to rest by considering a number of important criticisms against Pogge. But 
before I engage in a critical analysis and defense of Pogge’s thesis, a proper exposition 
of Pogge’s argument is in order.  
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2   Thomas Pogge’s Argument 
Introduction 
 The aim of this chapter is to consider in some detail Pogge’s argument for the 
individual’s responsibility for world poverty. In what follows, I consider the three 
different strands of arguments that Pogge puts forth in defense of his conclusion—the 
Lockean state-of-nature approach, the historical injustices approach and the 
institutional approach. I will discuss each briefly, explaining how on each baseline, 
Pogge argues that the prevailing global poverty manifests a violation of our negative 
duties not to harm the global poor. My focus, however, will be on the final approach—
the institutional approach. I will discuss Pogge’s argument based on the institutional 
approach in greater detail than the rest, showing how it justifies the two central claims 
made by Pogge in support of his final conclusion that the affluent are morally 
responsible for global poverty.  
 
2.1   Three Baselines  
 As mentioned in Chapter 1.1, Pogge’s argument rests on the basic assumption 
that we each have negative duties not to harm. In order to establish what our negative 
duty not to harm entails, we must consider what Pogge’s account of harm entails. 
According to Joel Feinberg, harm is defined broadly as a “thwarting, setting back, or 
defeating” of an interest, with “interest” defined as something in which a person has a 
stake.31
                                                        
31 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. 1: Harm to Others (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 31-51.  
 Since harm is defined in terms of a setting back of an interest, in order to arrive 
at an account of harm, we must first specify a baseline by which the relevant interest is 
to be judged as having been set back. Whether we have harmed or benefited the global 
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poor depends on the baseline that we employ for assessing the magnitudes of harm and 
benefit that we engender. It is thus crucial that we find the appropriate baseline by 
which to assess the prevailing state of affairs so as to establish what counts as harming 
the global poor.  
 I begin with the baseline that Pogge rejects as the appropriate benchmark for 
assessing harm to the global poor. One way to understand harm is to take it that a 
person is harmed when she is rendered worse-off than she was at an earlier time. 
Pogge, however, rejects such a diachronic understanding of harm as the appropriate 
benchmark for assessing the prevailing extent of global poverty today. The fact that 
there is less severe poverty in the world today than there was ten years ago is not 
morally relevant to the question of whether or not the present global order is harming 
the poor. For even if it were true that there is not as much poverty today as there was a 
decade ago, it does not follow that the present global order is therefore benefiting the 
global poor. 
 An analogous case to illustrate this point would be that of how we surely would 
not consider a man who abuses his child regularly to be benefiting his child if he now 
beats his child less frequently than he usually does. The fact that the father’s less 
frequent beatings is rendering the child a little better off than before does not mean that 
the child is therefore being benefited by his father.32
 In seeking a non-arbitrary and appropriate baseline by which the existing state 
 Similarly, it is possible, even if 
there is less poverty in the world today, that the present global order is still harming the 
global poor, albeit at a less alarming rate. For this reason, there is, I think, good reason 
for Pogge to reject the diachronic understanding of harm as the morally relevant one in 
our assessment of what counts as harming the global poor.  
                                                        
32 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 23.  
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of affairs of this world is to be measured against, Pogge considers three baselines: the 
Lockean state-of-nature baseline, the historical injustices baseline and the institutional 
baseline. Each of the three baselines that Pogge considers is independent of the others. 
They work in parallel as separate strands in Pogge’s arguments for the same 
conclusion: that the existing global poverty manifests a violation of the affluent 
individuals’ negative duty not to harm. The fact that they work in parallel means that, 
even supposing that we reject two of the three approaches, responsibility for global 
poverty can still be justified on the third approach. Pogge’s approach here to 
demonstrating harm is thus clearly ecumenical. By considering three different accounts 
of harm defined in terms of three independent baselines in his argument, he provides 
justification of his conclusion to philosophers of different moral and political 
conceptions, thereby securing broad support for his arguments. I turn now to the task 
of briefly outlining these three baselines and explaining how, on each of these 
baselines, Pogge argues for his conclusions. 
 
2.2   The Lockean State-of-Nature Baseline 
The Lockean proviso on acquisition states that persons in a state of nature are 
subject to the moral constraint that their unilateral appropriations of unowned resources 
from nature must always leave “enough, and as good” for others.33
                                                        
33 John Locke, “An Essay Concerning The True Original, Extent, and End of Civil 
Government,” (1689) in John Locke: Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), §27 and §33. 
 That is to say, in 
the acquisition of private property, each must be confined to a proportional share of the 
world’s natural resources. The lifting of this enough-and-as-good proviso is subject to 
a second-order proviso—that all participants rationally come to an agreement to 
change the rules of human coexistence. Since no one would rationally accept a revision 
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of these rules unless one expects to be better off under a new set of rules, it is only if 
everyone will be better off under the new rules than anyone would be under the old 
that the Lockean Proviso may be overridden. Therefore, on the Lockean state-of-nature 
baseline, a person is harmed if he is not at least as well off as a person would be in a 
hypothetical Lockean state-of-nature where each enjoys a proportional share of the 
world’s resources.34
Pogge argues that the present institutional order must be said to be harming the 
global poor when measured against this Lockean baseline. Given that billions are born 
into the world today deprived of access to resources already owned by others and with 
only their labour to rent out, Pogge argues that it can hardly be said that the global poor 
enjoys anything close to a proportionate share of the world’s natural resources.
  
35 As 
such, the Lockean proviso is not met. Furthermore, in light of the radical inequality 
that exists in the world today, Pogge seriously doubts that the condition for the lifting 
of the Lockean proviso (the second-order proviso) is met. He thinks that it is unlikely 
that all are better off under the existing rules of appropriation than anyone would be 
under the Lockean Proviso. For not only are they deprived of a proportional share in 
the world’s resources, the global poor also have no choice but to suffer the burdens of 
environmental degradation which are brought about by the affluent’s flagrant use of 
the abundant natural wealth.36
 Seeing as how the affluent consume a disproportionately large share of the 
world’s resources unilaterally, without compensation to the global poor, Pogge writes 
that “citizens and governments of affluent states are violating a negative duty of justice 
when they, in collaboration with the ruling elites of the poor countries, coercively 
 
                                                        
34 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 208. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 209. 
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exclude the poor from a proportional share of the world’s resources.”37
 
 Pogge 
maintains that, on the Lockean state-of-nature baseline, we in the affluent nations are 
harming the global poor by taking, without due compensation, a disproportionately 
large share of the world’s resources while failing to leave “enough, and as good” for 
others. With this argument, Pogge shows how, on the Lockean state-of-nature baseline, 
the prevailing global poverty manifests a violation of the affluent individuals’ negative 
duties not to harm the global poor. 
2.3   The Historical Injustices Baseline 
On the historical injustices baseline that Pogge considers, the present economic 
and institutional order is viewed as harming the global poor if the existing radical 
inequality in starting positions is the result of past actions and circumstances that were 
marked by grievous wrongs.38 The thought here, for Pogge, is that radical inequalities 
that are the products of a morally tarnished history should not be allowed to persist.39
Pogge argues that in view of the common and violent history that we share, it is 
difficult to see how the prevailing radical inequalities in our social starting positions 
could be justified under any historical entitlement conception of justice. He points out 
that the world as it is today, with its massive inequalities in social starting positions, 
was significantly shaped by a violent past that was marked by conquests and 
colonization which left many native cultures and institutions destroyed by oppression, 
 
The question of whether affluent individuals are harming the global poor in this case 
thus involves looking at historical facts about how the gross inequalities in today’s 
standards of living evolved.  
                                                        
37 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 209. 
38 Ibid., 209-210. 
39 Ibid., 209. 
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enslavement and even genocide.40 Given that the social starting positions of the worse-
off and the better-off today are the results of a single historical process pervaded by 
historical crimes that massively violated moral principles and legal rules, Pogge 
contends that the immense advantages that we in the affluent world enjoy over others 
today are gained from unjust means and are therefore unjustified.41
There are some who might wish to insist that those of us whose ancestors were 
perpetrators of these historical crimes have some special restitutive responsibility 




 But this 
is not Pogge’s argument. Rather, Pogge’s focus is on the fact that the present 
generation of affluent individuals are upholding and allowing the prevailing radical 
inequality to continue. By coercively upholding an inequality that is unjustified insofar 
as it is dependent on grave injustices in history, Pogge argues that the affluent are 
violating their negative duty not to harm the global poor. On the historical injustices 
baseline, therefore, the prevailing global poverty similarly manifests a violation of the 
affluent individual’s negative duties not to harm the global poor.  
2.4   The Institutional Baseline 
 The institutional baseline is based on a consequentialist conception of social 
justice, against which social institutions are assessed in terms of their effects and the 
kinds of feasible alternatives that are available.43
                                                        
40 Pogge, “Real World Justice,” 38. 
 On this baseline, we harm the global 
poor insofar as we collaborate in imposing unjust social institutions upon them, where 
41 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 209.  
42 Ibid. 
43 The Rawlsian conception of social justice is one example of a consequentialist conception of 
social justice, for it “considers a domestic economic order to be just if it produces fair equality 
of opportunity across social classes and no feasible alternative to it would afford better 
prospects to the least advantaged.” See Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 207. 
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social institutions are considered unjust insofar as they foreseeably give rise to 
avoidable underfulfillment of human rights.44
(1) There is a global institutional order that is imposed by the affluent on the global 
poor that foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the world in a 
significant way.  
 So, in support of the argument based on 
this institutional approach, Pogge must defend the following two claims: 
(2)  Affluent individuals have negative duties not to harm others and they violate 
this negative duty when they participate in and uphold a global institutional 
order that foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the world.  
In what follows, I will show how Pogge defends both these claims in support of his 
conclusion that affluent individuals have moral obligations to help the global poor by 
means of the institutional approach.  
 
The Empirical Claim 
I begin with Pogge’s defense of the empirical claim that (1) there is a global 
institutional order that is imposed by the affluent on the global poor that foreseeably 
and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the world in a significant way. To justify 
(1), Pogge must defend several further claims about the world: 
C1. The existing global poverty cannot be traced to extra-social factors 
(such as genetic handicaps or natural disasters). 
C2. There is a shared institutional order that is shaped by the affluent and 
imposed on the global poor.  
                                                        
44 Pogge, “Real World Justice,” 46. 
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C3.  This institutional order is implicated in the reproduction of global 
poverty in that there is a feasible institutional alternative under which 
such severe and extensive poverty would not persist.45
 Pogge maintains that the present world that we live in is characterized by these 
facts. According to Pogge, the first condition (C1) is met insofar as the global poor can 
be said to have as much of a chance of leading healthy happy lives had they been born 
in different social circumstances. He argues that because the root cause of the global 
poor’s plight is their poor social starting positions which deprive them of opportunities 
to become anything but poor, vulnerable and dependent, this condition is met.
 
46
 As for the second condition (C2), Pogge writes that “the global poor live within 
a worldwide states system based on internationally recognized territorial domains, 
interconnected through a global network of market trade and diplomacy.”
  
47 He argues 
that this shared institutional order, which affects the global poor through “investments, 
loans, trade, bribes, military aid, sex tourism, culture exports, and much else,”48
 A defense of the third condition (C3) involves two main tasks. Pogge must 
argue, firstly, that the existing global institutional order that we now live in is in fact 
one that gives rise to human rights deficits. Additionally, he must show that there are 
feasible alternatives to the existing global institutional order under which the life-
 is 
imposed by the affluent onto the global poor. This is made possible by the vastly 
superior military and economic strength that the affluent possess over the poor, which 
allows them to control and shape the rules that structure these international 
interactions.  
                                                        
45 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 205.  
46 Ibid., 207.  
47 Ibid., 205. 
48 Ibid. 
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threatening poverty that exists under the present institutional order would be wholly or 
largely avoided.   
 Meeting the first task involves looking at the causal role of global institutions in 
the persistence of severe poverty. According to Pogge, global poverty cannot be 
explained solely by local explanatory factors. He rejects the bias of portraying and 
taking local factors to completely explain global poverty—what he calls “explanatory 
nationalism”49
D1. The international borrowing privilege allows any group holding 
governmental power in a national territory—regardless of how it acquired or 
exercises this power—to borrow funds in the name of the whole country. As a 
consequence of this borrowing privilege, groups in power are in the position of 
imposing internationally valid legal obligations upon the country at large. What 
this means is that (a) a country’s full credit might be placed at the disposal of even 
the most corrupt rulers who might have taken power in a coup and who can further 
maintain themselves in power through violence and repression, even against near-
universal popular opposition, (b) the incentives toward coup attempts and civil war 
are strengthened, and (c) a country may be saddled with huge debts of its former 
oppressors. All these undermine the capacity of fledging democratic governments 
—and argues that several features of the global institutional order play a 
significant role in perpetuating poverty. In support of this empirical assertion, Pogge 
identifies three important features of the global institutional order (D1-D3, below) that 
go some way in underscoring the causal role that global institutions play in 
perpetuating global poverty. 
                                                        
49 For a discussion of explanatory nationalism, see Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 
§5.3, 145-150. 
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(if any) to effectively restructure and implement reforms,50
D2. The international resource privilege confers upon the group in power 
effective control over the natural resources of the country, including the power to 
effect legally valid transfers of ownership rights in such resources. This privilege 
provides powerful incentives toward coup attempts and civil wars in resource-rich 
countries,
 and so place further 
barriers to breaking out of the cycle of poverty. 
51
D3. The governments of more powerful countries also enjoy a “crushing 
advantage” in bargaining power and expertise in international negotiations. 
Negotiators of affluent countries exploit this advantage, shaping the global rules in 
the interests of their own governments, corporations and citizens, at the expense of 
the global poor. The result of such lopsided negotiations is, Pogge argues, “a 
grossly unfair global economic order under which the lion’s share of the benefits 
of the economic growth flows to the most affluent states.”
 thereby facilitating oppression and poverty in poorer countries.  
52
 These three aspects of the global institutional order contribute substantially to 
the perpetuation of poverty in less-developed countries. D1 and D2 significantly shape 
the national policies and kinds of governments that come to power in poor countries 
for the worse, thereby affecting the overall incidence of poverty in these countries, in 
particular, the resource-rich ones. D3 exploits the weaknesses, ignorance, and 
sometimes, corruptibility of the less-developed countries. While the incompetence, 
corruptibility and tyranny of entrenched local governments in the poorer countries may 
lie at the heart of the problem of global poverty, Pogge argues that such features of our 
global institutional order undeniably serve to either facilitate oppression and poverty in 
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the poorer countries, or else harm the global poor by placing further barriers on poorer 
populations that are trying to escape poverty. 
 Meeting the second task involves showing that there are alternatives to the 
present unjust institutional order. Since Pogge argues that the misery of the worse-off, 
who are being impoverished and starved under our shared institutional arrangements, is 
only justified if there were no institutional alternative under which such misery would 
be avoided,53 he must, in defending the third condition (C3), show that there are 
feasible alternatives to the existing global institutional order under which the existing 
levels of poverty would be avoided. He does this by way of proposing what he calls the 
Global Resources Dividend or GRD proposal. Briefly, this proposal envisions that 
states and their governments will be required to share a small part of the value of any 
resource that they decide to use or sell, such that the global poor may be compensated 
for their inalienable stake in the limited natural resources in this world.54
 
 The GRD 
proposal is thus one example of a reform proposal that realistically supports his claim 
that there are indeed institutional alternatives to the existing unjust one. 
The Institutional Conception of Social Justice  
 Having shown how Pogge argues in defense of (1), let us turn now to Pogge’s 
defense of (2), the claim that we each have negative duties not to harm others and that 
we violate this negative duty when we participate in and uphold a global institutional 
order that foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the world.  
 On the institutional baseline, harm is conceived in terms of an independently 
specified conception of social justice. If the minimal requirements of such a conception                                                         
53 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 207. 
54 I will not elaborate on the GRD; for a full discussion of the details of the GRD and its 
rationale and feasibility, see Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Chapter 8, 202-221. 
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of social justice are not met, the given institutional order is considered to be 
unjustified. Therefore, to draw this baseline, it is necessary to decide on the appropriate 
conception of social justice to employ. Given that broadly consequentialist theorists 
may hold significantly different conceptions of social justice (in terms of how they 
characterize the relevant affected parties, the metric of assessing relevant effects and 
how to aggregate relevant effects across affected parties, etc.), Pogge’s ecumenical 
answer to this diversity is to specify what he considers is a very minimal condition of 
justice that is widely accepted.55
 Before I engage in a discussion of the conception of social justice that Pogge 
employs in making his argument, let me first briefly explicate the moral (as opposed to 
the legal) notion of human rights, as conceived by Pogge. According to Pogge, a 
commitment to human rights involves recognizing that human persons “with a past or 
potential future ability to engage in moral conversation and practice have certain basic 
needs, and that these needs give rise to weighty moral demands.”
 He does this by way of formulating the core criterion 
of basic social justice in terms of the broadly accepted language of human rights. 
56 On Pogge’s 
conception, human rights “express a special class of moral concerns, namely ones that 
are among the most weighty of all as well as unrestricted and broadly sharable.”57 
While Pogge does not provide an exhaustive list of the basic needs that he thinks 
should enjoy the special standing of human rights, he names several, including 
“physical integrity, subsistence supplies (of food and drink, clothing, shelter, and basic 
health care), freedom of movement and action, as well as basic education, and 
economic participation.”58
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 Pogge suggests that our understanding of human rights can take on two forms: 
institutional and interactional. On the more conventional interactional understanding 
of human rights, it is governments and individuals who, as individual agents, bear a 
responsibility not to violate human rights. On the institutional understanding of human 
rights, however, human rights are conceived in terms of moral claims against coercive 
social institutions, and therefore, against those involved in the imposition and design of 
such coercive social institutions. Additionally, human rights on the institutional 
understanding are conceived in terms of underfulfillment rather than violation. A 
human right to life is fulfilled for specific persons if and only if their security against 
certain threats does not fall below certain thresholds.59
 Pogge proposes that we adopt the latter, interactional understanding of human 
rights. On this alternative understanding of human rights, the focus is not so much on 
how individuals bear responsibility for violating the human rights of others; the focus 
is rather on how affluent individuals bear responsibility for a global institutional order 
that engenders global poverty in a way that is foreseeable and avoidable. The 
institutional understanding of human rights has it that the responsibility of 
governments and individuals is to design and work for an institutional order and public 
culture that ensures that all members of society have secure access to the objects of 
their human rights—namely, minimally adequate shares of basic freedoms and 




 It is in terms of this institutional understanding of human rights that Pogge 
formulates his minimal conception of social justice. Pogge points out that most 
theorists would agree that a national economic order that leaves social and economic 
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human rights underfulfilled on a large scale is unjust, if there are feasible alternative 
orders under which these human rights would be better realized. He further argues that 
this demand of justice must apply to the global order as well as to domestic 
institutional arrangements.61 Given this, Pogge argues that an unjust global 
institutional order is one that foreseeably reproduces an avoidable human rights deficit, 
and the minimal requirement of social justice is “that any institutional order must be 
designed so that, insofar as reasonably possible, the human rights of those on whom it 
is imposed are fulfilled.”62
 Harm, conceived in terms of this independently specified conception of justice, 
is therefore defined in terms of (i) the underfulfillment of human rights that (ii) is 
produced by an institutional order that is created and upheld by agents, and that (iii) is 
foreseeable (in the sense that it foreseeably gives rise to substantial human rights 
deficits), and (iv) is reasonably avoidable (in the sense that there are alternative 
institutional orders available and also that these alternatives are foreseeable). 
According to this baseline, therefore, “you harm others insofar as you make an 
uncompensated contribution to imposing on them an institutional order that 
foreseeably produces avoidable human rights deficits.”
  
63
Taking together this account of harm and the negative duty not to harm others, 
we arrive at the conclusion that we are under a negative duty not to create or 
uphold institutions that foreseeably and avoidably produce human rights deficits. 
Thus we see how Pogge argues for the central claim that (2) we each have negative 
duties not to harm others and that, by participating in and upholding a global order that 
  
                                                        
61 Pogge’s argument for this is a complex one that I cannot possibly do justice here. For a full 
discussion, see Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Chapter 4, and Thomas Pogge, “The 
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foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the world, we violate this 
negative duty not to harm others.  
 
Summary   
 I have, in this chapter, discussed the three different approaches that Pogge 
employs in arguing for the conclusion that by doing nothing to help eradicate poverty, 
we are violating our negative duty not to harm the global poor. I have focused, in 
particular, on the last of the three approaches—the institutional approach. According to 
the institutional approach, the existing poverty in the world can be traced to the effects 
of certain features of our shared global institutional order. The imposition of such an 
institutional order by the affluent on the global poor is unjustified given that alternative 
institutional arrangements are available. On Pogge’s institutional account, we are, as 
affluent individuals, violating our negative duty not to harm others because and to the 
extent that we are upholding a shared institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably 
engenders a global underfulfillment of basic human rights. Given this, he argues that 
we are obliged to either discontinue our involvement in harming the poor by 
extricating ourselves from the global institutional system—often not a realistic 
option—or else compensate for these harms done onto the poor by working for 
institutional reforms or mitigating the harms inflicted on victims.64
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3   Objections To Pogge 
Introduction 
Responsibility is typically something that is predicated of agents. Bearing in 
mind that institutions refer to the set of social practices that conglomerate collectives 
engage in (such as the set of economic practices undertaken by the International 
Monetary Fund), and not to the conglomerate collectives themselves that implement 
these social practices (such as the International Monetary Fund),65 we find that we run 
into difficulties if we try to locate responsibility for institutional actions in the 
institutions themselves. This is because institutions, as social rules and practices, lack 
the agency that is typically required of bearers of responsibility. Insofar as institutions 
refer to the social relationships that generate social practices, rules and expectations 
and so are “static conduits” rather than active doers, institutions do not themselves 
have agency and so cannot have responsibility ascribed to them.66
Who, then, should bear responsibility for the harms caused by the global 
institutional order? Pogge’s answer to this question of where to locate responsibility 
for the harms of the global institutional order is, as we have seen in Chapter Two, to 
place the burden of responsibility on those who are centrally involved in shaping, 
supporting and participating in the global institutional order—affluent individuals. On 
Pogge’s account, affluent individuals are responsible insofar as they act within the 
relevant institutions and are capable of designing or changing the institutions in ways 
such as to respect or violate the basic human rights of the global poor.
  
67
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the actions that lead to the structuring of the institutions in those particular ways that 
make the institution more or less just. Thus, insofar as a global institutional order 
harms the poor, it is, for Pogge, the individual and collective agents involved in 
shaping and supporting that institutional order who should be held responsible.68
Leaving aside questions about the truth of Pogge’s empirical claims about the 
causal factors of global poverty, my aim in this chapter is to examine whether Pogge is 
justified in his move of ascribing moral responsibility for global poverty to affluent 
individuals by way of considering Bittner’s objection. As noted in Chapter One, the 
negative duty not to harm others is a widely accepted duty. Accepting that we have 
negative duties not to harm others, Pogge claims that by participating in and supporting 
the existing and ongoing global institutional order, which foreseeably and avoidably 
engenders severe poverty in the world, the affluent are violating their negative duty not 
to harm the global poor. This claim admits of two possible readings:  
  
(2a) Collective Harming: By participating in and supporting the existing and 
ongoing global institutional order, which foreseeably and avoidably engenders 
severe poverty in the world, the affluent violate their negative duty not to 
collectively harm the global poor.  
(2b) Individual Harming: By participating in and supporting the existing and 
ongoing global institutional order, which foreseeably and avoidably engenders 
severe poverty in the world, the affluent violate their negative duty not to 
individually harm the global poor.  
While the first reading has it that affluent individuals harm the global poor as a 
collective, the second has it that affluent individuals harm the global poor as 
individuals. In his argument, Pogge does not specify in which of these two senses of                                                         
68 Pogge, “Real World Justice,” 43. 
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harming—whether individually or collectively—he holds affluent individuals to be 
harming the global poor. Against Pogge, Bittner objects that affluent individuals 
cannot be said to harm the poor on both readings. According to Bittner, while it may be 
true that affluent individuals did something together, “neither collectively nor 
individually were they master over what emerged.”69
In what follows, I will develop and consider four specific objections in support 
of Bittner’s point. Arguing along the lines of Bittner’s more general objection, I show 
how it might be argued that affluent individuals can neither be said to harm the global 
poor collectively nor individually. Against the first reading, I suggest the objection that 
affluent individuals cannot be said to collectively harm the global poor insofar as they 
do not constitute a collective. Against the second reading, I suggest three possible 
objections: The first is an objection based on the contribution principle, the second is 
an objection based on the criteria of sufficient agency, while the third is an objection 
based on the lack of harmful intent.  
  
 
3.1   Objection to the First Reading: Collective Harming 
Against Pogge’s claim that affluent individuals violate their negative duty by 
collectively harming the global poor, one might argue that affluent individuals in no 
sense constitute a collective, and so cannot be said to collectively harm the global poor. 
This objection takes the form of the following argument:  
P1. The sense of “harming a person” that is relevant to Pogge’s argument is the 
sense in which one’s harming a person renders one morally responsible for 
having harmed the person, such that if one cannot be held morally responsible for 
harms, then one cannot be said to have harmed in the relevant sense.                                                         
69 Bittner, 30, emphasis mine. 
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P2. The capacity for intentional action is an essential feature of moral agency, 
which in turn is a necessary feature of responsible agents.   
P3. Understood collectively, affluent individuals lack the capacity for intentional 
intention, and so lack the moral agency necessary to count as morally responsible 
for harms.  
C. Therefore, understood collectively, affluent individuals cannot be said to harm 
in the relevant sense.  
With regards to the first premise, presumably, the sense of harm that we are 
interested in is the sense in which when I say that I have harmed someone, I mean also 
that I am morally responsible for the harm. Since Pogge is arguing based on a negative 
account of duty, where violating one’s negative duty not to harm gives rise to duties of 
redress, the sense of harm that is relevant to Pogge’s argument is clearly the sense in 
which my harming someone renders me morally responsible for the harms I have 
caused to the person. It follows from this that the contrapositive is also true, such that 
if one cannot be held morally responsible for harms, then one cannot be said to have 
harmed in the relevant sense.  
The second premise is the presupposition of most moral theories. On standard 
accounts of moral responsibility, moral agency is taken as a precondition for 
membership in the moral community. Further, it is generally accepted that to count as a 
moral agent, one must be capable of intentional action. Therefore, in order for one to 
qualify as a responsible agent, one must have the capacity for intentional action.  
The third premise states that affluent individuals do not, as a collective, qualify 
as a responsible agent. The term “affluent individuals” as used by Pogge picks out a 
large random group of individuals, comprising affluent citizens in developing states as 
well as most ordinary citizens in the developed ‘first-world’ states. These affluent 
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individuals, who participate in and support the ongoing global institutional order, do so 
in pursuit of their own ends and not on the basis of any shared common ends or 
intentions. Since these relevant affluent individuals “do not share aims, have no 
common projects, do not speak the same language, and much else,”70
Given P1, P2 and P3, it follows that it is untrue that affluent individuals can be 
said to harm in the relevant sense. For insofar as affluent individuals, taken 
collectively, lack the capacity for intentional action, a necessary precondition of moral 
agency, affluent individuals do not constitute a collectivity with moral agency, and so 
cannot be held morally responsible for anything. Accordingly, affluent individuals can 
in no way be said to act collectively to cause harm to the global poor and the first 
reading of Pogge’s claim does not stand.
 one might argue 
that it makes little sense to view this group of affluent individuals as having any 




3.2   Three Objections to the Second Reading: Individual Harming 
While affluent individuals may not constitute a collective and so cannot be said 
to own collective responsibility for global poverty, one may, in defense of Pogge, 
argue that the affluent are individually, as opposed to collectively, morally responsible 
for global poverty. In this section, I consider three objections that may be raised 
against this second reading of Pogge’s claim.  
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3.2.1   The Contribution Principle Objection 
The first objection that I consider views harming in terms of the contribution 
principle. As a start, let me clarify what it means to harm someone in terms of the 
contribution principle. Following Joel Feinberg, this objection considers harming 
someone as contributing to the setback of the person’s legitimate interests.72 But what 
does it mean to contribute to the setback of another’s legitimate interests? Ser-Min 
Shei suggests that one’s action does not “contribute to the setback of a person’s 
legitimate interests” if, even without one’s action, the person’s legitimate interests 
would have been set back to the same degree anyway and this not for the reason that 
someone else would take one’s position in the causal chain.73
Going by the contribution principle’s definition of harm, affluent individuals 
may be said to individually harm the global poor through their actions within the global 
institutional order only if the affluent individual’s action, considered alone, has the 
effect of setting back the legitimate interests of the global poor.
 
74
One paradigmatic instance of one’s actions having no marginal detrimental 
effect on the overall outcome in the said way is in that of the case of voting at a 
popular election, with a known majority of voters already voting for a particular 
candidate. Suppose that in an election I am in a large majority of voters who votes for a 
racist dictator who then goes on to cause grave harms to people of the minority race in 
my society. Had I not voted for the racist dictator, he would nonetheless have held the 
 What this means, 
then, is that I have not harmed another person if, even without my action, the person’s 
legitimate interests would have been set back to the same degree anyway (and this not 
for the reason that someone else would take my position in the causal chain).  
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majority of the votes, come to power, and caused grave injustices against the minority 
race. In a situation like that, it seems that the outcome of the election would have been 
the same regardless of whether or not I had voted for him. Even without my individual 
vote for him, the legitimate interests of those harmed by him would have been set back 
to the same degree anyway. Going by the foregoing definition of harm, since my act of 
voting for the racist dictator, viewed in isolation of the actions of others, has no 
marginal effect on the overall outcome (and this not for the reason that someone else 
would take my position in the causal chain), I cannot be said to have harmed 
individuals of the minority race by my action of voting for the evil dictator.  
Now, one might argue that the affluent individual’s part in harming the global 
poor through her participation in the global institutional order is analogous to the latter 
situation. There are, in this world, substantially large numbers of people who are 
already supporting and participating in the existing and ongoing global institutional 
order that harms the global poor. Given this, it seems true that the ordinary, average 
citizen’s non-participation in this global order, considered alone, makes no difference to 
the fact that millions of poor people will continue to suffer from the wrongs of the 
unfair global institutional order. As long as there are enough other people who 
participate in and support the global institutional order, one’s individual participation 
and support is likely to be insignificant. Even if one withdraws one’s participation from 
the global institutional order, the overall situation faced by the global poor will likely 
remain the same. If so, then it seems that, contrary to Pogge’s thesis, the affluent 
individual, considered alone, does no harm to the global poor by participating in and 
supporting the global institutional order. 
In considering this objection, it might here be useful to consider a real example 
that is situated in the context of global poverty. As I write this, thousands of civilians in 
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the Democratic Republic of Congo, in particular the women, are caught in the midst of 
a regional war that perpetuates massive atrocities such as rape, brutal killing and 
violence. This regional war, which has lasted for over a century, is the result of a deadly 
scramble for the country’s vast natural resources. Multiple armed groups use mass rape 
and slaughter against civilians as a deliberate means to intimidate and control local 
populations into letting them secure control of mines, trade routes and other strategic 
areas necessary for the trading of high-value minerals. Minerals such as tin, tantalum, 
tungsten and gold that are sourced from these conflict areas eventually wind up in the 
electronic devices (such as cell phones, computers and portable music players) that we, 
in the affluent countries, purchase. The huge profits that these armed militias earn from 
the illegal mineral trade help fund the war, and are thus a huge motivation for armed 
groups on both sides of the conflict to carry on with their perpetration of violence.75
Faced with these facts, we might ask ourselves if we have, by having bought 
electronics containing conflict minerals, harmed the poverty-stricken Congolese 
civilians in any way. On Pogge’s account, it seems we must be said to have harmed 
the Congolese civilians since, by purchasing the laptop, we participate in an economic 
order that foreseeably and avoidably causes them harm. Against Pogge, however, the 
following objection based on the contribution principle might be made: In a context as 
large as the global institutional order, it seems unlikely that our individual actions as 
affluent individuals, considered in isolation of the actions of others, are relevant to the 
overall outcome. Without my particular act of purchasing, say, this laptop, it seems 
likely that the legitimate interests of the Congolese citizens would have been set back 
to the same degree anyway. The fact of the matter is that my individual efforts at 
boycotting laptops containing conflict minerals, should I choose to do so, would 
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(when considered alone) probably be ineffectual in making any real difference to the 
overall situation in Eastern Congo. For as long as there are enough others who 
continue to purchase electronics that contain conflict minerals, my individual actions 
are likely to be too insignificant to be consequential. My actions, when considered in 
isolation of the actions of others, make no marginal contribution to the setback of the 
legitimate interests of the Congolese, and as such, it seems I cannot be said to have 
harmed them.  
This objection, based on the contribution principle, takes on the following line 
of argument: 
P1’. If the legitimate interests of the global poor would have been set back to the 
same degree anyway, even without the action of the affluent individual, then the 
affluent individual cannot be said to harm the global poor.  
P2’. Even without the affluent individual’s actions (considered in isolation of the 
actions of other individuals), the legitimate interests of the global poor would 
have been set back to the same degree anyway. 
C’. Therefore, the affluent individual (considered alone) cannot be said to 
individually harm the global poor.   
If this objection made from the contribution principle is correct, then the view 
that affluent individuals are individually harming the global poor through their 
participation in the global institutional order does not obtain.  
 
3.2.2   The Criteria of Sufficient Agency Objection 
 A second objection that might be raised against Pogge is the objection based on 
the criteria of sufficient agency. According to this objection, affluent individuals acting 
in the context of the global institutional order cannot be said to harm the global poor 
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insofar as they do not meet the criteria of sufficient agency to count as moral agents. 
The objection goes as such: 
P1”. If affluent individuals do not harm the global poor in a morally problematic way, 
then affluent individuals cannot be said to harm the global poor in the relevant sense.   
P2”. For affluent individuals to count as harming in a morally problematic way, affluent 
individuals must act in ways that meet the criteria of sufficient agency. 
P3”. Most affluent individuals acting in the context of the global institutional order do 
not act in ways that meet the criteria of sufficient agency. 
C”. Most affluent individuals acting in the context of the global order do not harm the 
global poor in a morally problematic way and so cannot be said to harm the global poor 
in the relevant sense.  
 In support of P1, one might argue that a distinction must be drawn between 
causal responsibility and moral responsibility. Consider a case where I have bought a 
flowerpot and placed it in the living room of my house. Someone else enters the room 
while I am away and drops the flowerpot out of the window and onto the street below 
with the intent of hurting a random passerby walking by. In a situation such as this, I 
am undeniably causally involved in the harm caused to the passerby insofar as I was 
the one who had bought the flowerpot, which then becomes the instrument of harming. 
However, as most would surely agree, it does not follow from the fact that I was 
causally involved in harming the passerby that I have thereby harmed the passerby in a 
way that renders me morally responsible. One can be causally involved in causing 
harm to another without having harmed him in a way that is morally problematic.76
 Presumably, the sense of “harming” that is relevant to Pogge’s argument is 
harming in the latter sense—that is, harming in a way that is morally problematic. 
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Thus, as expressed in the first premise of the above argument, “harming a person” 
should be understood as more than mere causal involvement in causing harm; it 
involves causing harms to a person in a way that is morally problematic. The obvious 
question that follows from drawing such a distinction is, “What counts as ‘harming in a 
way that is morally problematic’?” There are many ways to draw the line between the 
morally problematic and the morally unproblematic, and many important 
considerations that might be relevant in an assessment of what counts as harming in a 
morally problematic way. But perhaps most fundamental and most widely accepted 
amongst the range of considerations is the criteria of sufficient agency.  
Moral responsibility is typically something that is predicated only of agents, and 
one can be said to harm in a morally problematic way only if one acts as a moral agent. 
To count as a moral agent, one must first meet the criteria of sufficient agency. If this 
presupposition is correct, then, as stated in the second premise, affluent individuals 
must act in ways that meet the criteria of sufficient agency in order to count as harming 
in morally problematic ways.  
With this in mind, one might then argue that even though the agents involved in 
the ongoing global institutional order may have sufficient voluntariness, knowledge, 
rational decision-making etc, where their own personal actions are concerned, in the 
context of the global institutional order, the agency that they act on is a compromised 
one. It is not clear that these individuals may be said to meet the criteria of sufficient 
agency when their actions are combined in an uncoordinated way with the actions of 
many others whom they do not know, and which they cannot predict, to create 
outcomes that they never intended.77
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 In support of this third premise, one might argue 
that affluent individuals do not harm the global poor in a morally problematic way 
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insofar as they fail to meet two criteria of sufficient agency in their roles as participants 
of the global institutional order. The first is the criterion of having sufficient knowledge 
of the consequences of one's actions. The second is the criterion of having sufficient 
control over the consequences of one’s actions. Let us look at each in turn.  
 
First Criterion of Sufficient Agency – Knowledge of Consequences 
  The objection, based on the first criterion of having sufficient knowledge of the 
consequences of one’s actions, is as follows: 
P3.1 If affluent individuals act without knowledge of the consequences of their 
actions, then their actions do not meet the criteria of sufficient agency.  
P3.2 In the context of the global institutional order, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
for affluent individuals to foresee the consequences that will follow from their 
actions.  
P3.3 Most affluent individuals acting in the context of the global institutional order 
do so without sufficient knowledge of the consequences of their actions. 
P3”. Therefore, most affluent individuals acting in the context of the global order do 
not harm the global poor in a morally problematic way. 
  The first premise rests on our accepting that in contexts where we have no 
knowledge of the consequences of our actions, we cannot be said to act with sufficient 
agency. In support of this point, consider the following: Suppose that I am a bungee 
jump operator and I have been fully thorough in both the observance of the standard 
safety procedures as well as in the maintenance of my bungee jumping equipment. If, 
by some freak accident, one of my clients is killed as a result of the cord snapping 
despite my care in following the proper procedures, then although I may have causally 
contributed to his death, on standard accounts of responsibility, we would not say that I 
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have harmed him in a way that renders me morally responsible. The reason for not 
holding me responsible, it seems, is that I assisted him in doing the jump without 
knowing that harms will follow from my doing so. Without knowledge of the 
consequences of my actions, I cannot be said to have acted with sufficient agency to 
count as a full moral agent and so should not be held morally responsible for the death 
of the client. 
If we accept this, so the objection goes, then a similar line of argument may 
arguably be made with regards to the affluent individual’s role in global poverty, in two 
ways. Firstly, as many, including Thomas Pogge himself, have pointed out, the causal 
factors that lead to global poverty are complicated. While harming in the ordinary 
sphere of person-to-person interactions usually involves the individual singlehandedly 
setting back the legitimate interests of another, harming in the context of global poverty 
often takes place only as a result of the confluence of the actions of many different 
individuals. Given this, it is difficult for affluent individuals acting within the global 
institutional order to trace their actions down to their distant consequences.  
Secondly, even if the links between particular actions undertaken by affluent 
individuals and the actions’ resultant harms on the global poor are traceable, one 
might argue that the lack of both transparency and accountability where international 
policies are concerned renders it difficult for ordinary citizens to realize the harms that 
they cause through their actions. This is a point raised by Debra Satz, who argues that 
it is unclear what citizens of the world’s developed nations are morally responsible for 
given that they have little knowledge about the economic policies that their 
governments endorse. She offers, as an example, the policies of the IMF: 
The IMF is accountable to finance ministers and central bank governors, and its 
officers are not elected but rather appointed by agreement of governments. 
Further the voting arrangements in the IMF ensure the disproportionate influence 
of only a few developed countries, in particular the United States. Because IMF 
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policies are most often debated in secret, most people are unaware of the policies 
they debate. There is little accountability for international institutions and even 
less information about their policies than about domestic ones.78
 
  
The lack of both transparency and accountability where international policies are 
concerned, even in Western democracies such as the U.S., renders it difficult for 
ordinary citizens to acquire the relevant information necessary in realizing that their 
actions within the global institutional order are in fact harming the global poor. 
Given how difficult it is for affluent individuals acting in the context of the 
global order to trace their actions down to their distant consequences, one might argue 
that most affluent individuals acting in the context of the global order do so without 
sufficient knowledge of the consequences of their actions. If so, then affluent 
individuals do not act in ways that meet the criteria of sufficient agency and so cannot 
be held morally responsible for the harms that follow from their actions. 
 
Second Criterion of Sufficient Agency – Control Over Consequences  
The objection, based on the second criterion of having sufficient control over 
the consequences of one’s actions, is as follows:  
P3.1' If the consequences of the affluent individual’s actions are beyond her 
control, then the affluent individual does not act in ways that meet the criteria of 
sufficient agency.  
P3.2' In the context of the global institutional order, the consequences of the 
affluent individual’s actions depend on the actions and decisions of other 
individuals.  
P3.3’ In the context of the global institutional order, the consequences of the                                                         
78 Debra Satz, “What Do We Owe the Global Poor?” Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 1 
(2005): 50-51.  
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affluent individual’s actions are beyond her control.  
P3”. Therefore, in the context of the global institutional order, affluent 
individuals do not act in ways that meet the criteria of sufficient agency.  
 The first premise rests on the view that the moral agent is one who has a certain 
degree of control over the consequences of his or her actions. This seems right, for in 
contexts where the individual has no control over the consequences of his or her 
actions, it seems that the individual cannot be said to act with sufficient agency for the 
concept of responsibility to apply meaningfully.  
 The second premise suggests that for any action that the affluent individual 
undertakes, the consequences that follow are shaped by the actions and decisions of 
individuals other than herself. To understand this point, let us return to our earlier 
example about conflict minerals. When I, as an affluent individual, buy a laptop that 
contains conflict minerals, it seems that I am involved in causing harm to the 
Congolese only insofar as my action forms a part of a larger chain of events. The fact 
of the matter is that there are many other agents involved in the causal chain of events 
that connects my buying the laptop to the resultant harms suffered by the Congolese. 
These other agents act independently of me; my act of buying a laptop neither 
necessitates nor requires that these other agents in the causal chain act in the unethical 
ways that they do to acquire the minerals. For example, the manufacturers of my laptop 
could very well have used ethical and conflict-free minerals to meet my demand for a 
laptop, or the armed militias could very well not have resorted to violence in procuring 
the minerals.   
 With so much of the chain of events leading from my action to its harmful 
consequences resting on actions undertaken by others, it seems that the consequences 
of my actions depend on the actions and decisions of individuals other than myself. 
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Without there being armed militias willing to employ violence in the pursuit of 
procuring minerals, and without those countless other individuals who each play a role 
in the chain of processes leading up to my purchase of the laptop, my laptop purchase 
would either not have been possible, or else not have caused Congolese civilians to 
suffer. Given this, one might wish to argue that the blame must, surely, lie on those 
other agents who directly harm the Congolese and not on me. For if the outcomes of 
my actions depend on the actions and decisions of other agents down the causal chain, 
and so lie beyond my control, I do not meet the criteria of sufficient agency insofar as I 
have no control over the consequences of my actions.  
 Think of it this way: I am a knife-maker, and different people buy knives from 
me for various reasons. If some bandits decide to buy my knives to steal and rob from 
innocent families, surely I should not be held morally responsible for the crimes of the 
bandits. Since it was up to the bandits how they used the knives I make, and what they 
decide to do with the knives is beyond my control, the blame must lie on them and not 
me.  
The same point can be made with regards to the example on IMF policies. As 
Satz points out, in most developed countries, important and crucial decisions that shape 
the world’s economy are, more often than not, made by unknown bureaucrats in secret 
negotiations.79
                                                        
79 Satz, 50-51. 
 Given this, it is highly questionable to what extent ordinary citizens of 
affluent nations may be considered “significant collaborators” and “responsible 
participants” of the policies of the IMF and other such institutions. Since the 
consequences of the ordinary citizen’s participation in the global order is dependent 
upon the autonomous actions and decisions of other individuals, it follows that the 
consequences of her participation are beyond her control. Thus, in support of the third 
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premise, one might argue that the affluent individual does not meet the criteria of 
having sufficient control over the consequences of her actions, and so cannot be said to 
harm in a morally problematic way.   
 
3.2.3   The Lack of Harmful Intent Objection 
A third objection that can be raised against the second reading of Pogge’s claim 
is that while affluent individuals may knowingly harm the global poor by participating 
in the global institutional order, it does not follow that they thereby harm the global 
poor intentionally or in a morally problematic way. This is an objection raised by Ser-
Min Shei, who argues that affluent individuals who participate in a global institutional 
order that harms the global poor generally do not do so with any intention of harming 
anyone, and so do not harm the global poor in a morally problematic way.80
P1”. If affluent individuals do not harm the global poor in a morally problematic way, 
then affluent individuals cannot be said to harm the global poor in the relevant sense.   
 Her 
argument may be rendered as such: 
P2’’’. For actions to count as harming in a morally problematic way, actions 
need to be undertaken with the intent to harm. 
P3”’. Most affluent individuals do not act with the intention of harming the 
global poor.  
C”’. Therefore, most affluent individuals do not harm in a morally problematic 
way and so cannot be said to harm the global poor in the relevant sense.   
With regards to the first premise, the sense of harming that is relevant to 
Pogge’s argument is, as discussed in the previous section, harming in a way that is 
morally problematic. In support of the second premise, Shei introduces a set of                                                         
80 Shei, 151-152. 
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distinctions that offers a way of distinguishing the moral difference between different 
cases of intentional harm. According to Shei, there are two senses that one may 
“intentionally cause harm”: 
(i) I regard the fact that my action causes harm to another to be a decisive 
reason in favour of my undertaking the action. 
(ii) I regard the fact that my action causes harm to another to be neither a 
decisive reason for or against my undertaking the action.81
In the first sense of intentionally causing harm, I foresee that my action will 
produce a certain harmful outcome and I am motivated by the fact that it will cause 
harm to undertake the action. In the second sense of intentionally causing harm, I 
foresee that my action will produce a certain harmful outcome but I am not moved by 
the fact that it will cause harm to either undertake or abandon the action. In the latter 
sense of intentional harm, I undertake an action with certain known outcomes, but the 
outcomes that lead to harm do not form a part of my explicit goal and are not necessary 
parts of my desired ends.  
  
Shei maintains that it is only when one intentionally causes harm to others 
in the first sense that one causes harm in a way that is morally problematic; to 
intentionally cause harm in the second sense is morally unproblematic.82
 
 With this, 
Shei argues that since most ordinary affluent citizens intentionally cause harm to 
the global poor in the second sense rather than in the first, affluent individuals do 
not act within the global institutional order with the intention of harming the poor. 
Accordingly, they do not harm the global poor in a morally problematic way and so 
should not be held morally responsible for global poverty. 
                                                        




 I have, in this chapter, considered the set of plausible objections that can be 
raised in support of Bittner’s point that affluent individuals cannot be said to harm 
the global poor, whether as a collective or as individuals. The objection is that 
while affluent individuals cannot be said to harm as a collective insofar as they do 
not constitute a collective, they cannot be said to harm as individuals either, for 
reasons that (i) they do not contribute marginally to the setback of the poor’s 
legitimate interests, (ii) they fail to meet the criteria of sufficiency, and (iii) they act 
with no ill intention of harming the global poor. In the next chapter, I discuss how 
Pogge’s position is in fact defensible against these objections.   
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4   A Defense of Pogge: Replies to Objections 
Introduction 
In order to defend Pogge and deny Bittner his objection that affluent 
individuals cannot be said to harm the global poor—whether individually or 
collectively—I need only to show that affluent individuals can be said to harm the 
global poor either as a collective or as individuals. In this chapter, I do not attempt to 
refute the objection that affluent individuals do not harm the poor as a collective. I 
think that there is a point to this first objection, insofar as affluent individuals lack the 
proper decision-making structures and so lack the capacity for intentional action to 
properly count as a collective. Since the capacity for intentional action is typically 
regarded as a precondition of moral agency, many philosophers have argued that 
affluent individuals who have neither decision-making structures nor shared intentions 
or ends do not constitute a collective to count as a responsible agent.83
So, in defense of Pogge, I leave aside the objection that affluent individuals 
cannot be said to harm the global poor as a collective and argue against the objection 
that affluent individuals cannot be said to harm the global poor as individuals instead. 
In what follows, I refute the objection that affluent individuals cannot be said to 
individually harm the global poor by replying to the three strands of argument made in 
support of this objection—the contribution principle objection, the criteria of sufficient 
agency objection, and the lack of harmful intent objection.  
  
                                                        
83 Larry May suggests that a collective constitutes “a collection of persons with a decision-
making structure,” (p.270) while Margaret Gilbert suggests that a collective constitutes “any 
population of subjects who are party to a given joint commitment.” (p.102) For a full 
discussion of the issue of collective moral responsibility, refer to Larry May, “Collective 
Inaction and Shared Responsibility,” NOÛS 24, (1990): 269-277, and Margaret Gilbert, 
“Who’s to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and Its Implications for Group Members,” 




4.1   Reply to Contribution Principle Objection 
According to the contribution principle, affluent individuals may not be said to 
individually harm the global poor because the affluent individual’s action, considered 
alone, has no marginal detrimental effect on the overall outcome of the legitimate 
interests of the global poor. I argue that the objection based on this contribution 
principle is mistaken. For even if it were the case that one makes no contribution to the 
overall outcome of another’s legitimate interests, it does not follow that one cannot 
then be said to have caused harm. I argue that the contribution principle fails as a 
condition for determining what it means to harm someone. For not only does thinking 
of harm solely in terms of the contribution principle yield counterintuitive moral 
assessments, thinking about our role in the global order purely in terms of marginal 
contribution also does not capture what really is at stake at the global institutional 
level.84
Let us begin by considering the following scenario: Nine people are pushing a 
bus full of school children off the edge of a cliff so as to cause them harm. These nine 
people are fully capable of doing so without my assistance. Despite this, I decide to 
join them in their efforts to push the bus off the cliff. In such a scenario, should I be 
said to have harmed the busload of school children?  
 Hence, I posit that the objection based on the contribution principle should be 
rejected. 
                                                        84 Note that my rejection of the contribution principle is not inconsistent with my using the 
language of contribution elsewhere in the argument. There is a difference between thinking of 
harm “in terms of the contribution principle” and thinking of harm “in terms of contribution”. 
According to the former, one’s action does not contribute to the setback of a person’s 
legitimate interests if, even without one’s action, the person’s legitimate interests would have 
been set back anyway. According to the latter, one’s action contributes to the setback of a 
person’s legitimate interests simply if the action sets back the person’s legitimate interests.  
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Considered in purely consequentialist terms, there is no moral difference 
between my stepping in to help with pushing the bus and my walking away. The 
overall outcome would remain the same whether or not I participate in the efforts of 
the nine people—the bus full of school children will be seriously harmed. Thus, going 
by the reasoning of the contribution principle objection, because I make zero marginal 
contributions to the setback of the legitimate interests of the school children in the bus, 
I cannot be said to have harmed them.  
This conclusion strikes us as deeply counterintuitive. In a situation such as this, 
most people would regard my joining in the effort of pushing the bus as morally wrong 
and also as morally worse than if I had simply walked away. The reason for this, I 
suggest, is that, on a negative account of duty, there is in fact a morally relevant 
difference between my joining in the effort to push the school bus off the cliff and my 
walking away. On the negative account of duty, we each have a duty not to cause 
others harm that is both foreseeable and avoidable. Because what we are concerned 
with on the negative account of duty is the role of the individual on the causal end of 
the harm, I am responsible insofar as I have played a role in assisting the nine people in 
pushing the bus off the cliff. So even though I make no marginal contribution to the 
setback of the legitimate interests of the school children by stepping in to help the nine 
people push the bus, by doing so I involve myself in a collaborative effort of producing 
a harmful outcome that is both foreseeable and avoidable. This implicates me in the act 
of causing undue harms to the school children in the bus, and so renders me morally 
responsible for the harms caused insofar as I have violated my negative duty not to 
harm. If my above analysis is correct, one may be held morally responsible for the 
harms caused by the harmful activity that one engages in, even though one makes no 
marginal contribution to the setback of another’s legitimate interests.  
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In view of what has been argued, I suggest that thinking of harm in terms of the 
contribution principle is problematic and should be rejected as a condition for 
determining what counts as having harmed someone. For not only does the 
contribution principle yield counterintuitive moral assessments such as the one just 
discussed, the same counterintuitive results obtain when we apply the contribution 
principle to cases of voting. If we accept that the individual voter does no harm by 
voting for a racist dictator because his individual vote makes no marginal contribution 
to the overall election outcome and its resultant harms, then we are forced also to say 
that none of the voters can be said to have done any harm by having voted for the racist 
dictator. So even though the many votes in favour of the racist dictator had in fact 
resulted in grave harms and injustices, we are left with the conclusion that no one is 
responsible. This seems rather implausible. 
A second reason why the contribution principle should be rejected is that 
thinking about our role in the global order in terms of marginal contribution does not 
capture what really is at stake at the global institutional level. By viewing harm in 
terms of the individual’s marginal contributions to overall outcome, the objection 
based on the contribution principle fails to take into account the fact that harming in 
the context of global poverty is not an individual activity.  
On our standard account of responsibility, responsibility is attributed to specific 
agents for particular harms that they cause as a result of particular actions that they 
undertake. So if I am responsible for harming John, it is because I, as a specific agent, 
have performed some specific action that has caused him a discrete and identifiable 
harm. In the context of harming the global poor through the global institutional order, 
however, this is not the case. While I singlehandedly cause a discrete and identifiable 
harm to John when I strike him, the same kind of harm cannot be said of harms caused 
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to the global poor by the affluent individual who participates in the global institutional 
order. I do not, as an affluent individual, cause discrete, identifiable harms to the global 
poor through my actions alone. It is not by my actions alone, as an individual qua 
particular agent, that harm is inflicted on to the global poor. Rather, harming in the 
context of global poverty generally involves the affluent individual doing so indirectly, 
and only as a result of the convergence of his actions with that of several other 
individuals.  
For example, while it may be true that my action of buying a laptop that 
contains conflict minerals, considered alone, makes no direct marginal contributions to 
the overall setback of any poor individual’s legitimate interests, it does in fact make 
some such contributions to harm indirectly. By purchasing a laptop that contains 
conflict minerals, I create a demand for more of such conflict minerals to be produced. 
The contribution to overall demand that I make may be so slight as to be unnoticeable, 
but this does not mean that I make no contribution whatsoever. My contributing to a 
very small fraction of the overall demand for conflict minerals forms a part of a larger 
chain of events that result in the overall setback of others’ legitimate interests and so 
causes harm to others in some indirect way.  
Given this, it would be a mistake to think about our role in the global order in 
terms of the marginal contributions that one makes to the setback of another’s 
legitimate interests. By viewing harming in terms of the individual’s marginal 
contributions to overall outcome, the contribution principle objection views the actions 
of the individual in isolation of the actions of others within the same global order, and 
thus fails to account for the way the injustices of the global order are produced. The 
objection conveniently overlooks the institutional harms that are brought about by the 
combined actions of many individuals acting under the shared global institutional 
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order, and so arrives at the mistaken conclusion that affluent individuals do not 
contribute to harming the global poor.  
While the contribution principle objection is right in holding that the affluent 
individual’s action, considered in isolation of the actions of others, makes no marginal 
contribution to the overall outcome of the global poor’s legitimate interests, I argue 
that the affluent individual may nevertheless be held morally responsible for the harms 
suffered by the global poor. This is because the contribution principle does not capture 
what really is at stake in the context of the global order and so fails as a condition for 
determining what counts as harm on the negative account of duty.  
 
4.2   Reply to Criteria of Sufficient Agency Objection 
  Let us turn now to a defense of Pogge against the second set of objections, the 
criteria of sufficient agency objection. In reply to the objection based on the first 
criterion of sufficient agency—the criterion of having sufficient knowledge of the 
consequences of one’s actions—I argue that while it is right in suggesting that it is 
often difficult to predict the consequences that follow from one’s actions within the 
global institutional order, this is not always the case. In spite of the complicated ways 
of interactions in the global order, many of us are aware of the broad outlines of the 
consequences of our actions on the poor. There are many, for example, who are well 
aware of the consequences of purchasing certain brands of clothing and shoes that are 
produced under sweatshop conditions, but who nonetheless go on buying these 
products anyway. For those of us who knowingly harm the global poor, it seems the 
objection that we do not meet the criteria of sufficient agency insofar as we lack 
knowledge of the consequences of our actions does not apply. 
  But, more importantly, what of cases where I act without realizing that harm 
 64 
will result from my actions? I argue that it does not follow merely from the fact that I 
lack sufficient knowledge of the consequences of my actions, that I am therefore not 
morally responsible for the consequences of my actions. Suppose that as an owner of a 
chemical factory, I instruct my workers to discharge toxic wastewater into the sea, not 
knowing that doing so would result in grave harms. As a direct result of my actions, 
the waters are contaminated, and many people and animals living in the nearby coastal 
regions die from mercury poisoning. In such a situation, even though I acted without 
knowing that harms would follow from my action, most of us would, I think, agree that 
I should be held morally responsible.  
  The reason for this, I suggest, is that this scenario describes an instance of 
culpable ignorance or negligence. In cases of negligence, I am not aware of the risk of 
causing harm to someone even though I should have been aware. In failing to ensure 
that the way I dispose of the chemical wastewater would not be of harm to others, I fail 
to live up to a certain standard of care that is reasonably expected of me. The mere fact 
that I acted without knowing about the harms that will follow from my actions does not 
disconnect me from my responsibility. What matters is that if the harm is something 
that I can be reasonably expected to foresee as a result of my own actions, my failure 
to inform myself of the harmful consequences and to desist from taking the harmful 
action renders me morally culpable.  
  The earlier example about IMF policies is a case in point. Against Debra Satz’s 
objection, I argue that the obscurity of the decision-making processes of the IMF does 
not completely disconnect us from our responsibility. As Pogge rightly points out, if 
there is a problem of a lack of transparency in our governments, it is our responsibility 
to ensure that our political leaders do not “conceal what they are doing with the powers 
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we lend them.”85 It is reasonable to expect this of us because, and to the extent that, 
these decisions are made by people whom we have empowered. While it may be true 
that we should not be held morally accountable for political decisions made in 
obscurity and without our consent, we are not completely let off the hook either. Given 
that the decisions of our politicians and negotiators would count for nothing without 
the powers we delegate them, we are morally responsible to the extent that we have the 
minimal responsibility of demanding for greater transparency and accountability in our 
governments when we are aware of any such lack.86
  Therefore, against the objection based on the first criterion of sufficient agency, 
I argue that insofar as it is reasonable to expect us to realize the harms that follow from 
our actions, our failure to foresee such harms does not let us completely off the hook. 
This is not to say that it is always reasonable to expect us to realize that harms would 
follow from our actions. My point is that, in cases where it is reasonable to expect us to 
inform ourselves of the harms that might follow from our actions, we should be held 
morally responsible for the harmful consequences of our actions. I will say more of this 
in my concluding chapter.   
 Obliging the failure to do so 
would mean obliging the choice to remain blissfully ignorant while reaping the 
benefits of policies that are unjustly slanted in our favour.  
 I turn now to the objection based on the second criterion of sufficient agency—
the criterion of having sufficient control over the consequences of one’s actions. I 
argue that this objection fails insofar as it fails to capture what goes on in the context of 
the global institutional order. With regards to the knife seller example, the right 
response is, I think, to point out that the example does not quite capture what goes on 
in our interactions within the context of the global institutional order. To make the                                                         
85 Pogge, “Reply to Critics,” 79. 
86 Ibid. 
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example properly analogous to that of what goes on in the global institutional order, it 
must not only be the case that I am selling knives to bandits, I must also be the bandits’ 
regular supplier of knives. If I knew that the bandits whom I am selling the knives to 
intend to use the knives for morally bad ends, and I nonetheless supply them with 
knives regularly to upkeep their crimes, it is clear that I cannot disclaim responsibility 
altogether. This is not to say that the bandits are any less blameworthy. On the 
contrary, they are even more so than I am, for I am only a contributory cause to their 
eventual actions. However, by supporting them in their unworthy causes, I am not 
absolved either. 
I thus argue that the line of reasoning taken by the second objection is flawed. 
For it presupposes that the actions of those individuals involved in causing harms to 
the global poor are independent of each other. By characterizing the involvement of 
affluent individuals in terms of “the accidental confluence of many individual actions,” 
the objection misrepresents the way that affluent individuals are causally involved in 
harming the poor. It is certainly not true that the actions of affluent individuals are 
“combined in an uncoordinated way” with the actions of other individuals to result in 
the unforeseen result of harm to the global poor. What one does as an affluent 
individual participating in a global institutional order affects the decisions and actions 
of others within the same global institutional order. Given this, it is possible for the 
affluent individual to act in ways to avoid the harms that foreseeably result from their 
actions. As such, it would be misleading to claim that affluent individuals have 
absolutely no control over the consequences of their actions and so fail to meet the 
criteria of sufficient agency. 
Let us consider again as an example the use of conflict minerals for the 
production of electronics. When I purchase a laptop that contains conflict minerals, I 
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generate some demand for more conflict minerals to be acquired, thus indirectly 
harming the global poor. According to the objection, however, my act of buying a 
laptop does not require that these other individuals act in the unethical ways that they 
do to acquire the minerals. For example, the manufacturers of my laptop could very 
well have only used non-conflict minerals in the production of my laptop, or the 
mining of the conflict minerals could well have been conducted in an ethical way, such 
that my laptop purchase would not have eventuated in human rights violations. Had 
these other individuals along the causal chain acted differently, so the objection goes, 
my action would not have led to harms suffered by the Congolese.  
In reply, I contend that while it may be true that the actions of these other 
affluent individuals who harm the Congolese civilians are independent of mine, insofar 
as they are independent moral agents and so there is no necessity for them to act in any 
particular way, the fact of the matter is that my action of buying products with conflict 
minerals predictably influences other individuals to act in certain ways. Without 
demand for conflict minerals, there would be no point in the actions of these other 
individuals who procure conflict minerals in ways that harm the Congolese civilians. 
Clearly, my act of purchasing electronics with conflict minerals has some causal 
influence on how others act. If I act knowing that my action would likely causally 
influence others to act in ways that would result in harms to the global poor, and I can 
reasonably avoid such an outcome (at no great costs to myself) by choosing to act 
otherwise (such as by boycotting products with conflict minerals or campaigning for 
companies to set higher ethical standards on their manufacturing process), it seems 
untrue that I have absolutely no control over the consequences of my actions.  
Therefore, in reply to the objection based on the second criterion of sufficient 
agency, I argue that because the affluent individual is often in a position to avoid the 
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foreseeable consequences of her actions by choosing to act differently, her causal 
involvement in causing harm to the global poor is one that meets the criteria of 
sufficient agency and so also one that counts as morally problematic.   
 
4.3   Reply to Lack of Harmful Intent Objection 
I turn now to the third objection raised by Shei. Shei argues that affluent 
individuals who undertake actions knowing that it would lead to harm do not cause 
harm in a morally problematic way if the harmful outcomes that result from their 
actions are not necessary parts of their desired ends. I argue that Shei is mistaken. 
Considering the following three scenarios might help us see the three different levels of 
harming that are, to different degrees, violations of the duty not to harm. 
In the first scenario, suppose that I am a bungee jump operator. A person whom 
I secretly bear grudges against approaches me to assist him in bungee jumping. In 
preparing him for the jump, I deliberately pick a bungee cord that is worn and overused 
in the hope that the cord will break during his jump, thus killing him. As a direct result 
of my actions, my nemesis is killed because the overused cord snaps during his jump, 
as I had intended. 
In the second scenario, as a bungee jump operator, the decisive reason in favour 
of my undertaking whatever direct actions as a bungee jump operator is that it is a 
means to earn profits, and not because it is a means to inflict harm on customers. In an 
effort to cut costs, I am somewhat lax in my observance of safety procedures. I fail to 
replace bungee cords that are potentially unsafe as a result of normal wear and tear, 
despite knowing of the plausible dangers that this poses to my customers. As a direct 
result of my actions, a customer is killed because an overused cord snaps during his 
jump. 
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In the third scenario, I fail to comply to the safety standard procedures that I am 
obliged to follow as a registered bungee jump company simply because I have been 
careless. I overlook the fact that I am required to replace my bungee cords after every 
two years. As a direct result of my carelessness, a customer is killed because an 
overused cord snaps during his jump. 
These three scenarios each describe different kinds of harming that violate the 
negative duty not to harm to different degrees, from greatest to least. The first scenario 
appears to describe a clear-cut case of intentional harming. In cases of intentional 
harming, I regard the fact that my action would cause harm to someone to be a decisive 
reason in favour of undertaking the action. This seems to fit well with the first scenario 
described. In the first scenario, I regard the fact that using a worn bungee cord would 
cause harm to my nemesis as a decisive reason in favour of doing so, so as to bring 
about his death. Since I regard the fact that my action would lead to harmful outcomes 
to be a decisive reason in favour of my undertaking the action, by Shei’s reasoning, 
such an instance of harming is both intentional and morally problematic. This seems 
right; having performing an action that foreseeably and avoidably leads to harm, I must 
be said to have harmed in a morally problematic way. 
The second scenario appears to be an instance of reckless harming. In cases of 
reckless harming, although I do not aim at harming anyone, I am aware that my action 
is likely to lead to a harmful outcome. Despite this, I do not desist from my potentially 
harmful action. This seems to describe the second scenario well. In the second 
scenario, I have no intention of harming the customer; in fact, I have no knowledge 
that this specific cord would snap under the weight of this specific person. However, I 
am aware of the potential dangers that I am posing to my customers by not replacing 
the bungee cords, and despite that, I go ahead with doing so anyway. Since causing 
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harm to my customers is neither a reason for or against my decision not to replace 
overused bungee cords—cost cutting is—going by Shei’s reasoning, my act of harming 
the customer in a bid to cut costs is intentional but not morally problematic.  
I argue that Shei’s position on this is mistaken. When I intentionally undertake 
an action with certain foreseeable outcomes, I should be held morally responsible for 
the outcomes of my actions, even though some of the outcomes are not necessary parts 
of my desired end. For example, if I were to drop a bomb in the middle of a crowded 
city centre with the explicit goal of killing one man amidst the crowd, it seems that I 
should be held morally responsible for more than just my intent to kill the one man. I 
should be held responsible for harms suffered by the bystanders whom I have 
recklessly killed or injured as well. Even though the known result that many bystanders 
will be killed or injured as a result of my action is neither a motivating reason for or 
against my undertaking of bombing the city centre, it does not mean that I have not 
harmed these innocent bystanders in a morally problematic way. Against Shei, 
therefore, I argue that those who recklessly harm others cause harm that is both 
foreseeable and avoidable, and should, for that reason, be held morally responsible for 
the harms they cause.  
The third scenario describes an instance of negligence, or culpable ignorance. 
As mentioned earlier, in cases of negligence, I am not aware of the risk of causing 
harm to someone even though I should have been aware. As a registered bungee jump 
operator, I am supposed to be familiar with the proper safety procedures and standards. 
In failing to know this, I fail to live up to a certain standard of care that is both required 
and reasonably expected of me. My act of negligence is thus morally problematic, 
albeit to a lesser extent than in the previous two cases. Shei’s argument does not 
mention cases such as this one. However, it seems reasonable to assume that if on 
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Shei’s account acts of recklessness do not count as morally problematic, then neither 
will acts of negligence count as morally problematic. Against Shei, therefore, I contend 
that those who harm out of negligence do so in a way that is morally problematic as 
well and should be held morally responsible for the harms caused.  
With these distinctions in mind, I argue that affluent individuals who do not 
take harming the global poor as a decisive reason either for or against their harmful 
actions harm the global poor recklessly. Acts of recklessness are morally problematic 
insofar as they cause harm that is both foreseeable and avoidable, while acts of 
negligence are morally problematic insofar as they cause harm that one can reasonably 
be expected to foresee and avoid. Thus, I contend that Shei is wrong and this third 
objection based on the lack of intent to harm should be rejected. 
 
Summary 
 In defense of Pogge, I have, in this chapter, argued against the set of plausible 
objections supporting Bittner’s point that affluent individuals cannot be said to harm 
the global poor, whether as a collective or as individuals. While it may be the case that 
affluent individuals cannot be said to harm as a collective insofar as they do not 
constitute a collective, I argue that affluent individuals can in fact be said to harm the 
global poor as individuals. The objection that affluent individuals cannot be said to 
individually harm the global poor rests on three further objections—the contribution 
principle objection, the criteria of sufficient agency objection and the lack of harmful 
intent objection.  
Against the first objection based on the contribution principle, I argued that it 
fails for two reasons: firstly, thinking of harm solely in terms of the contribution 
principle yields counterintuitive moral assessments; secondly, thinking about our role 
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in the global order purely in terms of marginal contribution does not capture what 
really is at stake at the global institutional level. I argued that it does not follow from 
the fact that affluent individuals do not contribute marginally to harm that they are 
therefore not harming the global poor in a way that is morally problematic.  
Against the second objection based on the criteria of sufficient agency, I 
offered two replies. In reply to the first criterion—knowledge of consequences of one’s 
actions—I argued that where it is reasonable to expect us to know about the harmful 
consequences of our actions, we should be held morally responsible insofar as we fail 
to inform ourselves of the harmful consequences and so fail to desist from the harmful 
action. In response to the second criterion—control over consequences of one’s 
actions—I argued that in cases where we are in positions to avoid the harmful 
consequences of our actions by choosing to act differently, but we fail to do so, we 
should be held morally responsible for those harms.  
Against the third objection based on the lack of harmful intent, I argued that 
affluent individuals who cause harm to the global poor without the intent to harm 
nevertheless do so in a way that is morally problematic. For, insofar as their harming is 
both foreseeable and avoidable, they should be held morally responsible for the harms 
that they cause to the global poor.  
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5   Conclusion 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis has been to explore the extent of our moral responsibility 
to the global poor, as framed in terms of Pogge’s argument. Specifically, I have 
attempted to establish the extent to which we affluent individuals can be held morally 
responsible for global poverty, if we grant Pogge’s empirical claim that there exists a 
global institutional order that is foreseeably and avoidably perpetuating poverty in the 
world.  
In pursuit of this, I began, in Chapter One of this thesis, by bringing into 
question the reasons that people hold in excusing themselves from the duty to do more 
than they presently do for the global poor. I examined how these assumptions that 
underlie our inaction are unfounded insofar as they can and have been undermined by 
both Singer and Pogge, thus establishing that we are indeed morally responsible for 
global poverty.  
But to what extent are we morally responsible? I set out, in Chapter Two, a 
detailed exposition of Pogge’s argument for why we affluent individuals have strong 
moral obligations to the global poor, focusing in particular on Pogge’s institutional 
approach to the problem. According to Pogge, we are each morally responsible for 
global poverty because and to the extent that we participate in and benefit from a 
global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably perpetuates poverty in the 
world. I argued, however, that for Pogge to adequately defend his thesis, he must meet 
the general objection raised by Bittner that world poverty cannot be imputed to anyone, 
whether viewed in terms of collective or individual responsibility.  I thus considered, in 
Chapter Three, the set of objections that can be raised in support of Bittner’s objection. 
I then argued, in Chapter Four, that Pogge’s argument is defensible against the 
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objections considered, insofar as affluent individuals can indeed be said to individually, 
albeit not collectively, harm the global poor.  
My defense of Pogge, however, does not go all the way. For while I have 
shown the objections that I have considered in this thesis to be unpersuasive, I shall 
argue that these objections nevertheless point us to a very real and practical limit as to 
what Pogge can claim about the extent of our moral obligations to the global poor. 
Pogge’s conclusion about how morally responsible we are towards the global poor is a 
very strong one—according to him, we are morally responsible because and to the 
extent that we participate in and benefit from the global institutional order that 
foreseeably and avoidably perpetuates severe poverty in the world. In this concluding 
chapter, I argue that Pogge’s argument in support of such strong moral obligations is 
lacking. I suggest that Pogge does not succeed in establishing the strong conclusions 
that he draws about the extent of our moral obligations to the global poor, on two 
counts.  
Firstly, while Pogge is right in saying that we violate our negative duties insofar 
as we contribute to harming the global poor, I argue that he is mistaken in claiming that 
we violate our negative duties by benefiting from the harms of the global poor. 
Profiting or benefiting from the injustices of the global order per se does not constitute 
a violation of our negative duties toward the global poor. Secondly, I argue that Pogge 
is wrong to claim that simply by virtue of our participation in the ongoing and unjust 
global institutional order, we harm the global poor in a way that renders us morally 
responsible. I argue that to the extent that it is not reasonable to expect us to foresee or 
avoid the harms that follow from our participation in the global institutional order, our 
participation in the global order is not a violation of our negative duties and so does not 
render us morally responsible for global poverty.  
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In light of these two considerations, I argue that Pogge is committed to 
weakening his claims about the extent of our moral obligations to the global poor. I 
conclude by proposing how Pogge can modify his claims about what we owe to the 
global poor in order to preserve the tenability of his position, and finally, with a 
discussion of the significance of my proposed amendment on Pogge’s overall thesis.  
 
5.1   Profiting from Injustice – A Violation of Negative Duty? 
Thus far, my discussion of Pogge has centred on how by contributing to the 
imposition of an unjust global institutional order, we may be violating our negative 
duties not to harm others. Pogge, however, holds us morally responsible for more than 
just our contributions to harming the global poor. Occasionally, Pogge uses a broader, 
disjunctive formulation that invokes our negative duty not to contribute to or not to 
profit from the unjust impoverishment of others.87 According to Pogge, “how much one 
should be willing to contribute toward reforming unjust institutions and toward 
mitigating the harms one causes depends on how much one is contributing to, and 
benefiting from, their maintenance.”88
                                                        
87 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 197. 
 In characterizing our involvement in the unjust 
global institutional order, Pogge refers not only to the extent that we contribute to 
injustices toward the global poor through our participation in the global institutional 
order, but also to the extent that we benefit or profit (both terms are used 
interchangeably) from these injustices. This latter aspect of Pogge’s argument, which 
has been much neglected thus far in this paper, will be the focus of my discussion in 
this very last section of the thesis. 
88 Ibid., 50. 
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That we each have a negative duty not to contribute to injustice without 
compensation is something that most would find unobjectionable. But do we really 
have a negative duty not to benefit from injustice without compensation if our doing so 
does not also contribute to injustice? While Pogge seems to think that we do, I argue 
otherwise. In what follows, I shall argue that affluent individuals who benefit from the 
injustice of the global order but are not involved in contributing to the injustice owe no 
compensation to the poor pursuant to a negative duty not to harm.  
A good way to go about the task of figuring out whether benefiting from 
injustice per se is a violation of one’s negative duties is, I argue, to consider cases 
where people benefit from injustice without contributing to it. It would be instructive 
therefore to elucidate what counts as an instance of mere benefiting from injustice. 
Following Reitberger, I suggest that I harmlessly benefit from an injustice if my 
benefiting (i) does not reproduce further injustices, i.e., does not result in any 
‘collateral damage’, or (ii) my benefiting does not obstruct restorative justice.89
Having clarified what counts as harmlessly benefiting from injustice, I turn 
now to comparing mere benefiting from injustice with benefiting from natural harm or 
misfortune. We generally do not consider benefiting from the natural misfortune of 
 So, for 
example, if I buy goods that turn out to be stolen goods and my doing so perpetuates 
further injustices by creating demand for more of such goods to be stolen, my 
benefiting from the injustice is not harmless. Alternatively, if by keeping the stolen 
goods to myself, I prevent the stolen goods from being returned to its rightful owner 
and so prevent justice from being restored, then even though I had nothing to do with 
the theft, my benefiting from the injustice is not harmless.  
                                                        
89 Magnus Reitberger. “Poverty, Negative Duties, and the Global Institutional Order,” Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics 7, no. 4 (2008): 379-402. 
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others to be a violation of our negative duties. For example, we do not consider the 
doctor to have violated his negative duties when he makes a profit rendering his 
services to patients who have fallen ill. Neither do we think of ourselves as having 
violated our negative duties when we win a race because our stiffest competitor 
suffered from a muscle cramp during the race.  
If we think that there is nothing morally wrong with benefiting from the natural 
harm of others, why should we think there to be anything wrong with harmlessly 
benefiting from the unjust treatment of others? Absent of a good reason to construe 
both sorts of benefiting from harm differently, it is unclear why benefiting from natural 
harm should, on the negative account of duty, be considered morally different from 
pure benefiting from unjust harm. As mentioned earlier on in this paper, on the 
negative account of duty, what matters morally is the role that the individual plays on 
the causal end of the harm. Since in both cases, I benefit from the harms suffered by 
others, while making no contribution to the harms myself, it seems to me that there 
should be no moral difference between cases of benefiting from natural harm and those 
of benefiting from injustices. For as long as I do not contribute to the injustice, I am in 
no way responsible for bringing about or perpetuating the situation that causes harm to 
someone else and so cannot be said to have violated my negative duty not to harm. 
This objection has been discussed in some detail by both Norbert Anwander 
and Thomas Pogge in a symposium on Thomas Pogge’s World Poverty and Human 
Rights. While it is not my intention to revisit the full discussion between the two 
here,90
                                                        
90 For a full discussion of this issue, refer to Norbert Anwander’s “Contributing and 
Benefiting: Two Grounds for Duties to Victims of Injustice,” Ethics and International Affairs 
19, no.1 (2005): 39-45, and Pogge’s “Reply to Critics,” 69-74. 
 I wish to discuss two points of criticism raised by Anwander that I think Pogge 
fails to adequately address in his reply to Anwander.  
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The Duty Not To Profit from Injustice 
The first criticism that I consider is Anwander’s rejection of the claim that there 
is a negative duty not to profit from injustice, over and above the duty not to contribute 
to injustice. In his objection, Anwander refutes both the strong claim that it is always 
wrong to profit from injustice (i.e. the claim that there is a general duty not to profit 
from injustice), as well as the weaker claim that it is sometimes wrong to benefit from 
injustice (i.e. the claim that there is a more specific duty not to profit from injustice).  
Pogge agrees with Anwander that there is no general negative duty not to profit 
from injustice without compensating protection and reform efforts. In instances of 
profiting from injustice that feature historical injustices that can no longer be mitigated 
and whose victims are now dead (e.g. the Hiroshima case91), or in instances that 
feature profitings that cannot be declined by their beneficiaries (e.g. breathing cleaner 
air92
Pogge, however, rejects Anwander’s other claim that there is no specific 
negative duty not to profit from injustice without compensating protection and reform 
efforts. Anwander argues that the wrong-making feature in instances of benefiting 
from injustice without compensation lies not in the benefiting but rather in the 
contributing to injustice. So, for example, in the case of the Martians who shower us 
), Pogge is in agreement with Anwander that we have no negative duty not to 
profit from injustice without compensation.  
                                                        
91 One counterexample would be the Hiroshima case, where our knowledge of radiation can be 
directly traced back to the events at Hiroshima. However, the fact that patients receiving 
radiotherapy today have benefited from knowledge that was the product of grave injustices 
does not make it the case that these patients have done wrong pursuant to a negative duty not 
to profit from injustice by receiving radiotherapy treatment. See Pogge, “Reply to Critics,” 70. 
92 One counterexample would be that of how all people everywhere, whether they want to or 
not, enjoy air that is cleaner than it would be if many others were not unjustly kept in poverty 
and thereby constrained in their polluting activities. But those not involved in sustaining the 
injustice who also reap the benefits of cleaner air do not owe compensation to the poor 
pursuant to a negative duty not to profit from injustice. See Pogge, “Reply to Critics,” 70. 
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Earthlings with the spoils of injustices that they visit upon the Venusians, it would be 
wrong to keep the spoils and so benefit from the injustices, not because it is wrong to 
benefit from injustice per se, but because doing so prevents the restoration of goods 
and so contributes to injustice. By holding on to what is rightfully someone else’s, we 
obstruct restorative justice and so contribute to injustice.  
In response to Anwander’s point that our benefiting from injustice is wrong if 
and because it at the same time involves us in contributing to injustice, Pogge’s reply is 
that in order to make such an assertion, Anwander is committed to the following three 
points:  
(i) that each instance of wrongfully profiting from injustice without adequate 
compensation is, as a matter of fact, also an instance of contributing to 
injustice; 
(ii) that contributing to injustice figures in every such instance as a wrong-
making feature;  
(iii) that profiting from injustice does not figure in any such instance as an 
(additional) wrong-making feature.93
Pogge then goes on to argue that Anwander is wrong insofar as none of these 
three points are defensible. He points out, for example, that U.S. citizens of 1845 who 
clearly supported and profited from the injustice of enforced slavery—“most obviously 
by owning slaves, but also indirectly by purchasing cheap slave-produced 
commodities”—violated two distinct duties: they violated one negative duty insofar as 
they made uncompensated contributions to upholding the institution of enforced 
slavery, and they violated another negative duty insofar as they profited, without 
 
                                                        
93 Pogge, “Reply to Critics,” 71. 
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compensation, from the same unjust institution.94 Pogge notes that Anwander might 
argue, in response to this, that the benefit of owning slaves or purchasing cheap slave-
produced commodities is wrong only because it contributes to the injustice in some 
broad sense.95 However, he argues that because ‘it is quite unlikely that every instance 
of slave owning and every instance of purchasing cheap slave-produced commodities 
without compensation contributed to the imposition of the unjust institutional order,’96
 I think that Pogge’s reply misses the point of Anwander’s objection. Firstly, 
Anwander does not claim that every instance of profiting from injustice is also an 
instance of contributing to injustice. In fact, he clearly does not. For in holding that 
“situations of pure benefiting are very rare in the real world,”
 
Anwander must be wrong, and there must be a negative duty not to profit from 
injustice without compensation over and above the duty not to contribute to injustice.  
97 he implies that there 
are at least some instances of profiting from injustice that are not at the same time also 
instances of contributing to injustice. This is also evident from his claim that “[w]e can 
explain why most, but not all, cases of benefiting from injustice are thought to be 
wrong by pointing out that through most, but not all, such actions we in fact contribute 
to unjust harm.”98
                                                        
94 Pogge, “Reply to Critics,” 71. 
 Anwander’s point is that because instances of profiting from 
injustice is almost always in conjunction with instances that contribute to injustice, it is 
easy to be misled into thinking that profiting from injustice violates our negative duty. 
Thus Anwander is not committed to the above three claims that Pogge holds him to. 
He is only committed to saying that most instances of wrongfully profiting from 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Anwander, 40.  
98 Ibid., 41, emphasis mine. 
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injustice without adequate compensation are also instances of contributing to injustice, 
and that this might explain why we think that benefiting from injustice is wrong.  
Secondly, with regards to Pogge’s slavery example, if indeed there were an 
instance of purchasing cheap slave-produced commodities that does not contribute to 
the imposition of the unjust institutional order, it seems to me that Anwander would 
hold that such an instance of harmless purchase is not a violation of one’s negative 
duty. Pogge might dispute this by arguing that this is a counterintuitive bullet to have 
to bite. But the reason why this verdict strikes us as counterintuitive, I argue, is that it 
is difficult to conceive of how any purchase of a cheap slave-produced commodity 
could fail to also contribute to the injustice of slavery. By purchasing a cheap slave-
produced commodity, we inevitably contribute to injustice by at least implicitly 
endorsing or declaring our support for slavery. Pogge’s example is thus not a very 
good one to work with. If we really wanted to test our intuitions on the matter, we will 
need an example that is more obviously and unequivocally an instance where one’s 
benefiting from injustice without compensation is not also an instance of contributing 
to injustice.  
As Anwander correctly notes, such instances of mere or harmless benefiting are 
rare in the world.99
                                                        
99 Anwander, 40.  
 Typically, where one benefits from some injustice, one is also 
connected with the injustice in such a way that one is also contributing to the injustice. 
For example, each time we benefit from being able to purchase cheaply-produced 
clothing manufactured under sweatshop factory conditions, we are also contributing to 
the injustice of having people work under sweatshop conditions by supporting the 
sweatshop clothing industry and creating demand for more sweatshop clothing to be 
produced. However, one could conceivably profit from injustice without contributing 
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to it in the case where I pick up a second-hand sweatshop-produced t-shirt that has 
been thrown away by someone else. Supposing that this t-shirt is not available on the 
fair trade market, I benefit from the injustice of the sweatshop industry insofar as this 
item would not have been available to me otherwise. But since my doing so does not 
create any demand for more of such sweatshop clothing to be produced, I do not 
contribute to the injustice of the sweatshop industry.100
In such a scenario, do we say that I have, in having purely benefited without 
compensation from the injustice of the sweatshop, violated my negative duty not to 
harm? With this better constructed example, it seems that intuitions will likely lie with 
that of Anwander’s that my act of picking up a second hand sweatshop item that would 
otherwise have been thrown away should not be considered a violation of my negative 
duty. Since in this instance I profit passively without making contributions to the 
injustice of sweatshop practices, it seems I cannot be said to have caused others harm. 
Thus I argue, in support of Anwander, that insofar as my profiting from an injustice 
without compensation does not also contribute to the injustice in some way, I do not 
violate my negative duty not to harm.  
  
 
More Stringent and More Demanding Obligations 
In the preceding section, I rejected Pogge’s claim that there is a negative duty 
not to profit from injustice over and above the duty not to contribute to injustice.  I 
argued that we have moral obligations to the poor only to the extent that we contribute 
to the upholding of an unjust global institutional order that unduly harms the world’s                                                         
100 In order that no further demand is generated as a result of my action, we must assume that 
my wearing this t-shirt does not have any further impact on others wanting to buy sweatshop 
clothing from the stores. We must also assume that this t-shirt is generic enough (such that 
others cannot tell whether it is a fair trade or sweatshop item), so that I cannot be seen to be 
showing my support for the sweatshop industry.  
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poor. In this section, I will examine whether these moral obligations are made more 
demanding or stringent by the fact that we also benefit from these injustices.  
Contrary to Pogge, Anwander argues that mere profiting from injustice without 
compensation does not render one’s obligations to the victims of injustice more 
stringent or more demanding. He supports his assertion by way of the following 
example: We have in our possession two stolen objects that we know to be of equal and 
great value to their respective rightful owners. It happens that only one of the two 
objects are of great benefit to us, while the other is of no benefit to us at all. Supposing 
that we have an opportunity to compensate the owners, does having benefited from 
injustice render our obligations more demanding, such that we owe more in 
compensation to the owner whose stolen object we have benefited from? Alternatively, 
supposing that we have the opportunity to compensate only one of the two rightful 
owners, does having benefited from injustice render our moral obligations more 
stringent such that we have moral reason to compensate one over the other? Anwander 
argues that we have no moral reason to compensate either of the owners differently.101
In reply, Pogge simply asserts that his intuition contradicts that of Anwander’s 
on the matter. He writes, “But if, as I have argued, we may owe more compensation to 
the owner from whose object we have benefited, then it may well be that, other things 
being equal, we should discharge the larger of our moral debts.”
 
102
On your Belize vacation, you have been involved with four others in organizing a 
spectacularly successful beach party with fireworks. You are in charge of running 
the wet bar for your own account and, after all expenses are paid, are looking at a 
 The following two 
passages illustrate Pogge’s response to Anwander’s objection that profiting from 
injustice does not render our moral obligations as beneficiaries more stringent and 
more demanding, respectively: 
                                                        
101 Anwander, 44.  
102 Pogge, “Reply to Critics,” 71. 
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$600 surplus. There was a slight mishap at midnight, when risky fireworks 
display you five had advertised and prepared misfired and destroyed a small 
fishing boat on which some very poor local families depend for their livelihood. 
Eager to attract continued tourism to the area, the local authorities are turning a 
blind eye. Nonetheless, each of you five organizers has a moral obligation to pay 
one-fifth of the $850 needed to replace the boat. But your obligation, I would 
think, is more stringent than that of the other four. It is wrong for them to fly 




Suppose you pay your $170 share of the damage, but three of your friends do 
not. Here one may perhaps say of your remaining friend (who paid) that she has 
done all she was morally required to do. But one cannot say this of you, I think, 
if you fly off with your remaining $430 surplus, leaving the the poor families 
with a $510 loss. If three of your friends refuse to pay, you should hand over 
your entire surplus to the poor families. You have a negative duty not to profit 
from your beach party with risky fireworks when doing so means that other, 
innocent parties are harmed by it.104
 
 
Pogge’s conclusions strike me as deeply counterintuitive. For it seems that, in 
both cases, although I might feel a stronger obligation to compensate and an obligation 
to pay more than my share should my friends fail to do so, this sense of obligation 
cannot be based on the negative duty of redress. The negative duty of redress refers to 
the duty to rectify whatever wrongful harms one might have caused others. Since in 
both cases I compensate for my share of the harms, it seems to me that I would have 
fulfilled my negative duty of redress insofar as I have rectified the harms that I have 
caused.  
As a possible explanation, I suggest that the sense of extra moral obligation that 
one feels in a situation like that might perhaps rest on positive obligations rather than 
negative ones. For insofar as I have made a tidy profit, I am in a better position than 
my friends are in being able to help the locals who are in need. I argue that we would 
reach the same conclusions that Pogge reaches if we modified the example to make it 
such that, rather than profiting from the party, I happen to be far wealthier than my four                                                         
103 Pogge, “Reply to Critics,” 72. 
104 Ibid., 74.  
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other friends. Let us modify the scenarios such that I do not make a profit from the 
beach party, but instead I happen to be a billionaire. Given this, I think most of us 
would agree that, in the former scenario, even though it might be wrong for my friends 
to fly home without paying, it would be more wrong for me than it is for them to do so 
because I am far wealthier and so in a better financial position than them to make the 
compensation. Similarly, with regards to the latter scenario, if three of my friends 
refuse to pay, I think most of us would feel that I have more of a moral obligation than 
my not-so-wealthy friend who has paid her share to cover the rest of the losses suffered 
by the locals because I am in a better financial position than she is to do so.  
Positive duties are duties that rest on those with the ability to better the well 
being of those in positions worse-off than theirs. In both these modified cases, I 
acquire stronger and more demanding obligations to help on account of the fact that I 
am in a better position than the others to help. If what I have argued here is right, then 
there is a strong possibility that the real reason why one feels it is wrong to profit from 
injustice without compensation in Pogge’s example is because of the additional 
obligation that one gains from having made a tidy profit and so from being in a better 
position than the others to help those in need. If so, then what is doing the work in 
generating the intuition that we have stronger and more demanding obligations than 
others is the positive duty to aid rather than any alleged negative duty not to profit 
from injustice. Therefore, in support of Anwander, I argue that Pogge’s argument that 
profiting from injustice renders our obligations more stringent and more demanding is 
unpersuasive.  
I have, so far in this chapter, argued that Pogge is mistaken in thinking that we 
have a negative duty not to benefit from the injustices of the global institutional order 
without compensation, over and above the negative duty not to contribute to injustice. 
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Following Anwander, I contend that we have moral obligations to the global poor only 
to the extent that we contribute to the upholding of an unjust global institutional order 
that unduly harms the global poor, and that these moral obligations are not made more 
demanding or stringent by the fact that we also benefit from the injustices.  
 
5.2   What We Can Reasonably Be Expected To Do 
My second point of criticism against Pogge hinges on the notion of what can 
reasonably be expected of affluent individuals. In Chapter Three, I considered the 
objection that we affluent individuals cannot be said to harm the global poor because 
we fail to meet the criteria of sufficient agency in our roles as participants of a global 
institutional order to count as responsible agents. In reply to the objection, I argued that 
the affluent individual cannot deny all responsibility for, say, the unjust policies of her 
government on the basis that she was unaware of her government’s international 
economic policies and their implications. While it may be true that she should not be 
held morally accountable for the political decisions made in obscurity and without her 
consent, she cannot be completely let off the hook either. This is because she can 
reasonably be expected, given her responsibilities as a citizen, to have pushed for 
greater accountability and transparency in her government when she is aware of any 
such lack, and to hold her government responsible for whatever unjust policies they 
might have endorsed. I further argued that the affluent individual cannot deny all 
responsibility for the harms that follow from her actions by claiming that the 
consequences of her actions lie largely beyond her control. For insofar as the affluent 
individual is often in a position to avoid the foreseeable consequences of her actions by 
choosing to act differently, her causal involvement in causing harm to the global poor 
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is one that meets the criteria of sufficient agency and so also one that counts as morally 
problematic.   
If what I have argued in reply to the criteria of sufficient agency objection is 
right, it seems that Pogge’s conclusion that we are “significant collaborators” in the 
imposition of an unjust global institutional order in virtue of our participation in it is 
too strong a conclusion to draw. For if it is, as I have argued, the case that we are 
morally responsible for global poverty insofar as we can reasonably be expected to 
foresee and to avoid the harmful consequences that follow from our participation in the 
global institutional order, then the converse holds true as well. In instances where we 
cannot reasonably be expected to foresee or to avoid the harms that follow from our 
participation, it seems we cannot be said to have acted with sufficient moral agency to 
count as having harmed others in a way that renders us morally responsible.  
Think of it this way: If the bungee jump operator whose client is killed as a 
result of a freak accident—a sudden and unpredictable gust of wind causes the client to 
be killed—should not be held responsible for his client’s death because the unfortunate 
outcome was something that he could not reasonably be expected to foresee, then the 
same could arguably be said of the affluent individual who cannot reasonably be 
expected to foresee the harms that follow from her participation in the global 
institutional order. And if we think that the train driver whose train runs over some kids 
playing on the railway tracks as a result of an unexpected mechanical failure of the 
brakes should not be held morally responsible for the children’s deaths because the 
unfortunate outcome was not something that he could reasonably have been expected 
to avoid, then the same could arguably be said of the affluent individual who cannot 
reasonably be expected to avoid participation in an ongoing and unjust global 
institutional order.  
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If what I have argued is correct, mere participation in the global order is not 
sufficient in establishing that I am responsible for the global poor. While being a 
participant of the global order may be a necssary condition of responsibility for global 
poverty, the complexities of the global institutional order are such that not everyone 
who participates in the global order can reasonably be held morally responsible for the 
harms that follow. If I have absolutely no access to knowledge of the kinds of 
injustices that follow from my participation in the global institutional order, such that 
knowledge of the harms that follow from my participation are not reasonably 
foreseeable, it seems that, to that extent, I cannot be said to have caused harm in a way 
that renders me morally responsible. Similarly, if I have no feasible alternatives to 
bringing about the kinds of harms that I do through my participation in the global 
order, such that the harms that result from my participation is not reasonably avoidable, 
then, again, it seems that, to that extent, I cannot be said to have harmed in a way that 
renders me morally responsible.  
I believe that by taking into consideration what can reasonably be expected of 
affluent individuals, we arrive at conclusions that fall nicely in line with what Pogge 
wishes to argue for. For Pogge does, after all, admit that we have differentiated degrees 
of moral obligations towards the global poor: “I agree…that citizens who were born 
into an affluent family, have enjoyed an excellent education, and have a good job, 
wealth and influence bear more responsibility for their country’s policies than citizens 
with opposite characteristics.”105
                                                        
105 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 80. 
 This is certainly consistent with our intuitions. We do 
not think that the janitor at the local fast food restaurant is as responsible morally for 
the harms that follow from his participation in the global order as the bureaucrat tasked 
with negotiating IMF policies. Given each their different individual circumstances, 
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there are some things that the bureaucrat can reasonably be expected to foresee and 
avoid that the janitor cannot be reasonably be expected to foresee and avoid.  
Pogge’s conclusion, however, does not reflect this idea of differentiated 
responsibility. For in holding that we violate our negative duty not to harm the global 
poor because and to the extent that we participate in a global institutional order that 
foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the world, his conclusion seems 
to suggest that we all have equal responsibility in virtue of our participation in the 
global order. I do not deny Pogge’s point that most of us in today’s affluent 
democracies are very much well educated and secure economically and in our civil 
rights, have much free time and much political opportunities, and “do and can know 
much more about the world and the horrific poverty it contains on such a massive 
scale.”106 However, the fact that there are poor and marginalized citizens even in 
today’s affluent democracies who are much more limited in what they can reasonably 
be expected to do is something that must be taken into account in our ascription of 
moral blame and responsibility. This is not to say that those “laid-off steel workers, 
janitors, and single mothers in the affluent countries” are excluded in the conversation 
about how we can, together, fulfill our responsibilities of citizenship (as Pogge 
suggests).107
Discontinuing our participation in the ongoing global institutional order does 
not constitute a genuine or realistic choice for most, if not all, of us. Given this, we 
 They certainly can and should take up responsibility for their countries’ 
policies insofar as possible. However, insofar as this is unreasonably demanding 
because they are constrained by the practical limits and circumstances that they face, it 
would be unreasonable to accuse them of having acted wrongly pursuant to their 
negative duty not to harm others.  
                                                        
106 Pogge, “Reply to Critics,” 82. 
107 Ibid., 81.  
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have positive duties, based on our negative duties of redress, to contribute toward 
reforming unjust institutions and toward mitigating the harms we cause the global poor. 
The range of positive duties which we are committed to include activities that would 
likely lie outside the norms and even the laws of our society and state. These would 
include social, political and economic activities ranging from things like peaceful 
protest, to possibly revolutionary efforts such as civil disobedience. The costs of 
meeting our moral obligations toward the global poor may be very high—they might 
include facing legal penalties or a substantial reduction in our standard of living. While 
I think that affluent individuals can reasonably be expected to make substantial 
sacrifices in order to avoid causing severe harms to others in the world, to the extent 
that the costs of avoiding or compensating for the harms that follow from one’s 
participation in the global order are unreasonably high, it seems fair that we do not 
count the individual as having caused harm in a way that renders him morally 
responsible.  
The difficulty, of course, is in figuring out what counts as that which we can 
reasonably expect affluent individuals to foresee and to avoid, and what does not. I 
admit that my introducing this ‘reasonably foreseeable and avoidable’ clause 
introduces also a great deal of ambiguity to the attempt to draw up an account of moral 
responsibility for global poverty. However, the task of drawing any clear distinction 
between what counts as reasonable and unreasonable foreseability and avoidability is a 
difficult and complicated one that warrants a separate discussion in another paper. By 
introducing the clause of reasonable foreseeability and avoidability as a relevant 
consideration in our moral assessment of who should be held responsible for global 
poverty, I seek only to motivate the idea that there is a differentiation, with regards to 
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the extent of our moral obligations to the global poor, that needs to be made from 
individual to individual, that Pogge neglects to make. 
 
5.3   Refinements on Pogge’s Thesis 
I have, in this concluding chapter, argued against Pogge on two points. I have 
argued, firstly, that profiting from injustice does not count as a violation of one’s 
negative duties, and secondly, that we do not always violate our negative duties when 
we contribute to harms suffered by the global poor through our participation in the 
global institutional order. It follows from this that (i) benefiting from the injustices of 
the global institutional order cannot be said to render our moral obligations to the poor 
more stringent or more demanding, and (ii) in instances where we cannot reasonably 
be expected to foresee or to avoid the harms that follow from our participation, we 
cannot be said to have acted with sufficient moral agency to count as having harmed 
others in a way that renders us morally responsible.  
As I have discussed, Pogge is of the view that we are morally responsible for 
global poverty because and to the extent that we participate in and benefit from the 
global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably perpetuates severe poverty in 
the world. However, in view of the two criticisms that I have raised against his 
argument, I argue that Pogge is wrong to claim that all affluent individuals who 
participate in and benefit from the global institutional order that harms the global poor 
have moral responsibility to eradicate poverty. If what I have argued is correct, Pogge 
should weaken his claims about the extent of our moral obligations to the global poor. 
In place of Pogge’s thesis that: 
We violate our negative duty not to harm the global poor because and to the 
extent that we benefit from and contribute to the harms suffered by the global 
poor through our participation in a global order that foreseeably and avoidably 
engenders severe poverty in the world. 
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I propose the following amended thesis:  
We violate our negative duty not to harm the global poor because and to the 
extent that we contribute to harms to the global poor that we can reasonably be 
expected to foresee and avoid when we participate in an unjust global 
institutional order, where an unjust global institutional order is one that 
foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the world.  
 
Whereas Pogge’s thesis holds as responsible all who participate in a global 
institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe poverty in the 
world, my amended thesis does away with benefiting from injustice as a condition for 
moral responsibility, while introducing the clause of reasonable foreseeability and 
avoidability. By introducing considerations of what individuals can reasonably be 
expected to achieve, my amended thesis takes into account what particular individuals 
‘should have known’ and ‘could have done’ given their particular circumstances, such 
that individuals can be held as more or less responsible depending on the roles that 
they play in the institutional order and the particular circumstances that they are in. 
This refinement on Pogge’s thesis allows for attributions of responsibility that are 
context-sensitive, and so arrives at a more nuanced account of who can rightly be held 
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